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Multipebble Simulations for Alternating Automata
(Extended Abstract)
Lorenzo Clemente and Richard Mayr
LFCS. School of Informatics. University of Edinburgh. UK
Abstract. We study generalized simulation relations for alternating Bu¨chi au-
tomata (ABA), as well as alternating finite automata. Having multiple pebbles
allows the Duplicator to “hedge her bets” and delay decisions in the simulation
game, thus yielding a coarser simulation relation. We define (k1, k2)-simulations,
with k1/k2 pebbles on the left/right, respectively. This generalizes previous work
on ordinary simulation (i.e., (1, 1)-simulation) for nondeterministic Bu¨chi au-
tomata (NBA) in [3] and ABA in [4], and (1, k)-simulation for NBA in [2].
We consider direct, delayed and fair simulations. In each case, the (k1, k2)-
simulations induce a complete lattice of simulations where (1, 1)- and (n, n)-
simulations are the bottom and top element (if the automaton has n states), re-
spectively, and the order is strict. For any fixed k1, k2, the (k1, k2)-simulation
implies (ω-)language inclusion and can be computed in polynomial time. Further-
more, quotienting an ABA w.r.t. (1, n)-delayed simulation preserves its language.
Finally, multipebble simulations yield new insights into the Miyano-Hayashi con-
struction [10] on ABA.
1 Introduction
We consider simulation relations on (alternating) finite- and infinite word automata:
nondeterministic finite automata (NFA), alternating finite automata (AFA), nondeter-
ministic Bu¨chi automata (NBA) and alternating Bu¨chi automata (ABA). Simulation pre-
order is a notion of semantic comparison of two states, called left state and right state,
in automata, where the larger right state can match all moves of the smaller left one in a
stepwise way. Simulation preorder implies language inclusion on NFA/AFA/NBA/ABA
[3, 4], but not vice-versa. While checking language inclusion is PSPACE-complete for
all these classes of automata [7, 11], the simulation relation can be computed in poly-
nomial time [3, 4].
Checking simulation preorder between two states can be presented as a game with
two players, Spoiler and Duplicator, where Spoiler tries to prove that the simulation re-
lation does not hold while Duplicator has the opposite objective. In every round of the
simulation game, Spoiler chooses a transition from the current left state and Duplicator
must choose a transition from the current right state which has the same action label.
Duplicator wins iff the game respects the accepting states in the automata, and different
requirements for this yield finer or coarser simulation relations. In direct simulation,
whenever the left state is accepting, the right state must be accepting. In delayed simu-
lation, whenever the left state is accepting, the right state must be eventually accepting.
In fair simulation, if the left state is accepting infinitely often, then the right state must
be accepting infinitely often. For finite-word automata, only direct simulation is mean-
ingful, but for Bu¨chi automata delayed and fair simulation yield coarser relations; see
[3] for an overview.
These notions have been extended in two directions. Etessami [2] defined a hierar-
chy of (1, k) multipebble simulations on NBA. Intuitively, the k pebbles on the right
side allow Duplicator to “hedge her bets” and thus to delay making decisions. This extra
power of Duplicator increases with larger k and yields coarser simulation relations.
A different extension by Wilke and Fritz [4] considered simulations on ABA. In
an ABA, a state is either existential or universal. The idea is that Spoiler moves from
existential left states and universal right states, and dually for Duplicator.
Our contribution. We consider (k1, k2)-simulations on ABA, i.e., with multiple peb-
bles on both sides: k1 on the left and k2 on the right. Intuitively, Duplicator controls
pebbles on universal states on the left and existential states on the right (and dually for
Spoiler). This generalizes all previous results: the (1, k)-simulations on NBA of [2] and
the (1, 1)-simulations on ABA of [4].
For each acceptance condition (direct, delayed, fair) this yields a lattice-structured
hierarchy of (k1, k2)-simulations, where (1, 1)- and (n, n)-simulations are the bottom
and top element if the automaton has n states. Furthermore, the order is strict, i.e.,
more pebbles make the simulation relation strictly coarser in general. For each fixed
k1, k2 ≥ 0, (k1, k2)-simulations are computable in polynomial time and they imply
language inclusion (over finite or infinite words, depending on the type of simulation).
Quotienting AFA w.r.t. (k1, k2)-simulation preserves their language. We also pro-
vide a corresponding result for ABA by showing that quotienting ABA w.r.t. (1, n)-
delayed simulation preserves the ω-language. This is a non-trivial result, since a naı¨ve
generalization of the definition of semielective-quotients [4] does not work. We provide
the correct notion of semielective-quotients for (1, n)-simulations on ABA, and show
its correctness. Moreover, unlike for NBA [2], quotienting ABA w.r.t. (1, k) delayed
simulation for 1 < k < n does not preserve their language in general.
Finally, multipebble simulations have close connections to various determinization-
like constructions like the subset construction for NFA/AFA and the Miyano-Hayashi
construction [10] on ABA. In particular, multipebble simulations yield new insights into
the Miyano-Hayashi construction and an alternative correctness proof showing an even
stronger property.
2 Preliminaries and Basic Definitions
Automata. An alternating Bu¨chi automaton (ABA)Q is a tuple (Q,Σ, qI , ∆,E, U, F ),
where Q is a finite set of states, Σ is a finite alphabet, qI is the initial state, {E,U} is
a partition of Q into existential and universal states, ∆ ⊆ Q×Σ ×Q is the transition
relation and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states. We say that a state q is accepting if
q ∈ F . We use n to denote the cardinality of Q. A nondeterministic Bu¨chi automaton
(NBA) is an ABA with U = ∅, i.e., where all choices are existential. We say that Q is
complete iff ∀(q, a) ∈ Q×Σ. ∃(q, a, q′) ∈ ∆.
An ABA Q recognizes a language of infinite words Lω(Q). The acceptance con-
dition is best described in a game-theoretic way [5]. Given an input word w ∈ Σω,
the acceptance game Gω(Q, w) is played by two players, Pathfinder and Automa-
ton. Existential states are controlled by Automaton, while Pathfinder controls universal
states. Automaton wins the game Gω(Q, w) iff she has a winning strategy s.t., for any
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Pathfinder counter-strategy, the resulting computation visits some accepting state in F
infinitely often. The language Lω(Q) recognized by Q is defined as the set of words
w ∈ Σω s.t. Automaton wins Gω(Q, w). See [4] for a formal definition.
If we view an ABA Q as an acceptor of finite words, then we obtain an alternat-
ing finite automaton (AFA). For w = w0 . . . wm ∈ Σ∗, the finite acceptance game
Gfin(Q, w) is defined as above for Gω(Q, w), except that the game stops when the last
symbol wm of w has been read, and Automaton wins if the last state is in F . Lfin(Q) is
defined in the obvious way. An alternating transition system (ATS) Q is an AFA where
all states are accepting, and Tr(Q) := Lfin(Q) is its trace language. When we just say
“automaton”, it can be an ABA, AFA or ATS, depending on the context.
If Q is a set, with 2Q we denote the set of subsets of Q, and, for any k ∈ N, with
2Q,k we denote the subset of 2Q consisting of elements of cardinality at most k. When
drawing pictures, we represent existential states by q and universal states by q .
Multipebble simulations. We define multipebble simulations in a game-theoretic way.
The game is played by two players, Spoiler and Duplicator, who play in rounds. The
objective of Duplicator is to show that simulation holds, while Spoiler has the comple-
mentary objective. We use the metaphor of pebbles for describing the game: We call
a pebble existential if it is on an existential state, and universal otherwise; Left if it is
on the l.h.s. of the simulation relation, and Right otherwise. Intuitively, Spoiler controls
existential Left pebbles and universal Right pebbles, while Duplicator controls universal
Left pebbles and existential Right pebbles. The presence of >1 pebbles in each side is
due to the further ability of Duplicator to split pebbles to several successors. Moreover,
Duplicator always has the possibility of “taking pebbles away”. Since not all available
pebbles have to be on the automaton, k + 1 pebbles are at least as good as k.
Formally, let Q be an alternating automaton, q0 ∈ 2Q,k1 a k1-set and s0 ∈ 2Q,k2 a
k2-set. We define the basic (k1, k2)-simulation game G(k1,k2)(q0, s0) as follows. Let
Γ Sp and ΓDup be a set of actions (or transitions) for the two players (to be specified
below). In the initial configuration 〈q0, s0〉, Left pebbles are on q0 and Right pebbles
on s0. If the current configuration at round i is 〈qi, si〉, then the next configuration
〈qi+1, si+1〉 is determined as follows:
– Spoiler chooses a transition (qi, si, ai,q′, s′) ∈ Γ Sp.
– Duplicator chooses a transition (qi, si, ai,q′, s′,qi+1, si+1) ∈ ΓDup.
We now define the two transition relations. Let qE := q∩E be the set of existential
states in q, and define qU , sE, sU similarly. Let P1 := 2Q,k1 × 2Q,k2 and P0 := Σ ×
2Q,k1 × 2Q,k2 . Γ Sp ⊆ P1 × P0 models Spoiler’s moves: (q, s, a,q′, s′) ∈ Γ Sp iff
Spoiler chooses a as the next input symbol, and
– q′ is obtained from qE by choosing a successor for each pebble in qE . Formally,
q′ = { select(∆(q, a)) | q ∈ qE }, where select(r) chooses an element in r.
– Similarly, s′ is obtained from sU by choosing a successor for each pebble in sU .
Duplicator’s moves are of the form (q, s, a,q′, s′,q′′, s′′) ∈ ΓDup ⊆ P1 × P0 × P1:
– q′′ is a non-empty k1-subset of q′ ∪∆(qU , a), and
– s′′ is a non-empty k2-subset of s′ ∪∆(sE , a).
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Notice that Duplicator is always allowed to “take pebbles away”, and to “hedge her
bets” by splitting pebbles into different successors. We say that a pebble on state q is
stuck if q has no a-successor (where a is clear from the context).
We now formally define strategies. A strategy for Spoiler is a function δ : P ∗1 P1 7→
P0 compatible with Γ Sp, i.e., for any (π · 〈q, s〉) ∈ P ∗1 P1, δ(π · 〈q, s〉) = (a,q′, s′)
implies (q, s, a,q′, s′) ∈ Γ Sp. Similarly, a strategy for Duplicator is a function σ :
P ∗1 P1 7→ (P0 7→ P1) compatible with ΓDup, i.e., for any π ∈ P ∗1 P1 and (a,q′, s′) ∈
P0, σ(π)(a,q
′, s′) = 〈q′′, s′′〉 implies (q, s, a,q′, s′,q′′, s′′) ∈ ΓDup. A play π =
〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 · · · ∈ P ∗1 ∪ P
ω
1 is a finite or infinite sequence of configurations in P1.
For a word w = a0a1 · · · ∈ Σ∗ ∪ Σω s.t. |w| = |π| − 1 (with |π| = ω = ω − 1
if π ∈ Σω), we say that a play π is σ-conform to w iff, for any i < |π|, there exists
some (qi, si, ai,q
′
i, s
′
i) ∈ Γ
Sp s.t. σ(〈q0, s0〉 . . . 〈qi, si〉)(ai,q′i, s
′
i) = 〈qi+1, si+1〉.
Intuitively, σ-conform plays are those plays which originate when Duplicator’s strategy
is fixed to σ; δ-conform plays, for δ a Spoiler’s strategy, are defined similarly. Below,
both strategies are fixed, and the resulting, unique play is conform to both.
The game can halt prematurely, for pebbles may get stuck. In this case, the win-
ning condition is as follows: If there exists a Left pebble which cannot be moved, then
Duplicator wins. Dually, if no Right pebble can be moved, then Spoiler wins.
Remark 1. Our winning condition differs from the one in [4] when pebbles get stuck.
There, the losing player is always the one who got stuck. If we let Duplicator win
when Spoiler is stuck on a universal Right pebble, we would obtain a simulation which
does not imply language containment. (Notice that “simulation implies containment”
is proved in [4] under the assumption that pebbles do not get stuck.) Furthermore, the
condition in [4] is unnecessarily strong when Duplicator is stuck on a universal Left
pebble, where letting Spoiler win is too conservative. Our definition generalizes the
correct winning condition to multiple pebbles, for which we prove “simulation implies
containment” without further assumptions.
In all other cases, we have that all Left pebbles can be moved and at least one Right
pebble can be moved, and the two players build an infinite sequence of configurations
π = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 · · · ∈ Pω1 . The winning condition is defined in terms of a predicate
C(π) on π. Different choices of C(π) lead to different notions of simulation.
1. Ordinary (k1, k2)-simulation. The acceptance condition is ignored, and Duplicator
wins as long as the game doesn’t halt: C(π) :⇐⇒ true.
2. Existential direct (k1, k2)-simulation. Duplicator wins if, whenever every q ∈ qi is
accepting, then some s ∈ si is accepting:
C(π) :⇐⇒ (∀i. qi ⊆ F =⇒ si ∩ F 6= ∅) .
3. Universal direct (k1, k2)-simulation. Duplicator wins if, whenever some q ∈ qi is
accepting, then every s ∈ si is accepting:
C(π) :⇐⇒ (∀i. qi ∩ F 6= ∅ =⇒ si ⊆ F ) .
As we will see, ordinary simulation is used for ATSs, while existential and universal
direct simulation are used for automata over finite and infinite words, respectively.
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The winning condition for delayed and fair simulation requires some technical
preparation, which consists in the notion of being existentially/universally good since
some previous round. Given the current round m, we say that a state q ∈ qm has
seen a state qˆ since some previous round i ≤ m, written has seenim(q, qˆ), iff either
1) q = qˆ, or i < m and there exists q′ ∈ qm−1 s.t. 2.1) q ∈ ∆(q′, am−1), and 2.2)
has seenim−1(q
′, qˆ). Dually, we write cant avoidim(q, qˆ) iff either 1) q = qˆ, or i < m
and, for all q′ ∈ qm−1, q ∈ ∆(q′, am−1) implies cant avoidim−1(q′, qˆ). We overload
the notation on the set of accepting states, and we write has seenim(q, F ) to mean that
q has seen some qˆ ∈ F ; and similarly for cant avoidim(q, F ). Finally, we say that sj
is existentially good since round i ≤ j, written good∃(sj, i), if at round j every state
in sj has seen an accepting state since round i, and j is the least round for which this
holds [2]. Similarly, we say that qj is universally good since round i ≤ j, written
good∀(sj , i), if at round j every state in qj cannot avoid an accepting state since round
i, and j is the least round for which this holds. Formally,
good∃(sj , i) ⇐⇒ (∀s ∈ sj. has seen
i
j(s, F )) ∧
∀j′. (∀s′ ∈ sj′ . has seen
i
j′(s
′, F )) =⇒ j′ ≥ j
good∀(sj , i) ⇐⇒ (∀s ∈ sj. cant avoid
i
j(s, F )) ∧
∀j′. (∀s′ ∈ sj′ . cant avoid
i
j′(s
′, F )) =⇒ j′ ≥ j
We write good∃(sj), omitting the second argument, when we just say that sj is good
since some previous round. For a path π = s0s1 . . . , we write good∃(π,∞), with the
second argument instantiated to i = ∞, to mean that good∃(sj) holds for infinitely
many j’s; and similarly for good∀(sj) and good∀(π,∞).
We are now ready to define delayed and fair simulations.
4. Delayed (k1, k2)-simulation. Duplicator wins if, whenever qi is universally good,
then there exists j ≥ i s.t. sj is existentially good since round i:
C(π) :⇐⇒ ∀i. good∀(qi) =⇒ ∃j ≥ i. good
∃(sj , i) .
5. Fair (k1, k2)-simulation. Duplicator wins if, whenever there are infinitely many
i’s s.t. qi is universally good, then, for any such i, there exists j ≥ i s.t. sj is
existentially good since round i:
C(π) :⇐⇒ good∀(π0,∞) =⇒ (∀i. good
∀(qi) =⇒ ∃j ≥ i. good
∃(sj , i)) ,
where π0 = q0q1 . . . is the projection of π onto its first component.
We will denote the previous acceptance conditions with x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f}, and
the corresponding game is denoted as Gx(k1,k2)(q0, s0).
Remark 2. Notice that the condition for fair simulation is equivalent to the follow-
ing simpler one: If qi is universally good since some previous round infinitely often,
then si is existentially good since some previous round infinitely often: C′(π) :⇐⇒
good∀(π0,∞) =⇒ good
∃(π1,∞), where π1 = s0s1 . . . is the projection of π onto
its second component.
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We are now ready to define the simulation relation⊑x(k1,k2), with x as above. We say
that a k2-set s x-simulates a k1-set q, written q ⊑x(k1,k2) s, if Duplicator has a winning
strategy in Gx(k1,k2)(q, s). We overload the simulation relation ⊑
x
(k1,k2)
on singletons:
q ⊑x(k1,k2) s ⇐⇒ {q} ⊑
x
(k1,k2)
{s}. For two automata A and B, we write A ⊑x(k1,k2)
B for qAI ⊑x(k1,k2) q
B
I , where the simulation is actually computed on the disjoint union
of A and B. If ⊑x(k1,k2) is a simulation, then its transitive closure is defined as 
x
(k1,k2)
.
Note that, in general,⊑x(k1,k2) is not itself a transitive relation.
Multipebble simulations hierarchy. In general, having more pebbles (possibly) gives
more power to the Duplicator. This is similar to the (1, k)-simulations for NBA studied
in [2], but in our context there are two independent directions of “growing power”.
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f} and k′1 ≥ k1, k′2 ≥ k2.
1. Inclusion: ⊑x(k1,k2) ⊆ ⊑
x
(k′
1
,k′
2
). (In particular, x(k1,k2)⊆x(k′1,k′2).)
2. Strictness: If k′1 > k1 or k′2 > k2, there exists an automatonQ′ s.t.⊑x(k1,k2) 6=⊑x(k′1,k′2).
Proof (Sketch). Point 1) follows directly from the definitions, since Duplicator can al-
ways take pebbles away. Point 2) is illustrated in Figure 1, which holds for any kind of
simulation x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f}. ⊓⊔
q
q1 q2
q3
s
s1 s2 s3
s4
a a
Σ \ {b1} Σ \ {b2}
Σ
a a a
c1
c2 c3
Σ
⊑x(2,3)
Fig. 1. Example in which q ⊑x(2,3) s, but q 6⊑x(k1,k2) s for any k1 ≤ 2, k2 ≤ 3, with k1 < 2
or k2 < 3. The alphabet is Σ′ = {a} ∪ Σ, with Σ = {b1, b2, c1, c2, c3}. Note that both
automata recognize the same language, both over finite and infinite words: Lfin(q) = Lfin(s) =
a(c1 + c2 + c3)Σ
∗ and Lω(q) = Lω(s) = a(c1 + c2 + c3)Σω .
Theorem 2. For any k1, k2 ∈ N>0 and any automatonQ,
1. ⊑∃di(k1,k2)⊆⊑
o
(k1,k2)
2. ⊑∀di(k1,k2)⊆⊑
de
(k1,k2)
⊆⊑f(k1,k2)⊆⊑
o
(k1,k2)
.
Moreover, for each containment, there exists Q s.t. the containment is strict.
Proof. The containments follow directly from the definitions. For the strictness, con-
sider again the example in Figure 1, with the modifications below. If no state on the
right is accepting, then no simulation holds except ordinary simulation. If q is accept-
ing, then universal direct simulation does not hold, but delayed simulation does. Finally,
if the only accepting state is q, then delayed simulation does not hold, but fair simula-
tion does. Is is easy to generalize this example for any k1, k2 ∈ N>0. ⊓⊔
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3 Finite words
Lemma 1. For any automatonQ with n states and states q, s ∈ Q:
1. q ⊑∃di(k1,k2) s implies L
fin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s), for any k1, k2 ∈ N>0.
2. q ⊑o(k1,k2) s implies Tr(q) ⊆ Tr(s), for any k1, k2 ∈ N>0.
3. Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s) implies q ⊑∃di(n,n) s, provided that Q is complete.
4. Tr(q) ⊆ Tr(s) implies q ⊑o(n,n) s, provided that Q is complete.
In particular, the last two points above show that existential-direct (resp., ordinary)
simulation “reaches” language inclusion (resp., trace inclusion) at (n, n).
Subset constructions. The subset construction is a well-known procedure for deter-
minizing NFAs [7]. It is not difficult to generalize it over alternating automata, where
it can be used for eliminating existential states, i.e., to perform the de-existentialization
of the automaton. The idea is the same as in the subset construction, except that, when
considering a-successors of a macrostate (for a symbol a ∈ Σ), existential and uni-
versal states are treated differently. For existential states, we apply the same procedure
as in the classic subset construction, by taking always all a-successors. For universal
states, each a-successor induces a different transition in the subset automaton. This
ensures that macrostates can be interpreted purely disjunctively, and the language of a
macrostate equals the union over the language of the states belonging to it. Accordingly,
a macrostate is accepting if it contains some state which is accepting.
The previous construction can be dualized for de-universalizing finite automata. For
an AFA Q, let S∃(Q) and S∀(Q) be its de-existentialization and de-universalization,
respectively. (See Definitions 1 and 2 in Appendix B.1.)
The following lemma formalizes the intuition that multipebble simulations for AFA
in fact correspond to (1, 1)-simulations over the appropriate subset-constructions.
Lemma 2. Let Q1,Q2 be two AFAs over the same alphabet Σ, with |Q1| = n1 and
|Q2| = n2. Then, for any k1 ≤ n1 and k2 ≤ n2,
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(k1,n2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ Q1 ⊑
∃di
(k1,1)
S∃(Q2) (1)
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(n1,k2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ S
∀(Q1) ⊑
∃di
(1,k2)
Q2 (2)
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(n1,n2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ S
∀(Q1) ⊑
∃di
(1,1) S
∃(Q2) . (3)
4 Infinite words
Multipebble existential-direct simulation is not suitable for being used for ω-automata,
since it does not even imply ω-language inclusion.
Theorem 3. For any k1, k2 ∈ N>0, not both equal to 1, there exist an automaton Q
and states q, s ∈ Q s.t. q ⊑∃di(k1,k2) s holds, but L
ω(q) 6⊆ Lω(s).
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q s
a a a
b c
b c
⊑∃di(1,2)
(a) An example in which q ⊑∃di(1,2) s
holds, but Lω(q) 6⊆ Lω(s).
q0
q1
s0
s1 s2
a
b
b
a
a b
a b
6⊑f(n,n)
(b) An example in which Lω(q0) ⊆
Lω(s0) holds, but q0 6⊑f(n,n) s0.
Fig. 2. Two examples.
Proof. Consider the example in Figure 2(a). Clearly, q ⊑∃di(1,2) s holds, since Duplicator
can split pebbles on the successors of s, and one such pebble is accepting, as required
by existential-direct simulation. But Lω(q) 6⊆ Lω(s): In fact, (ab)ω ∈ Lω(q) = (a(b+
c))ω , but (ab)ω 6∈ Lω(s) = ((ab)∗ac)ω. ⊓⊔
This motivates the definition of universal-direct simulation, which does imply ω-
language inclusion, like the coarser delayed and fair simulations.
Theorem 4. For x∈{∀di, de, f}, automatonQ, k1, k2 ∈ N>0 and states q, s ∈ Q,
q ⊑x(k1,k2) s implies L
ω(q) ⊆ Lω(s) .
Unlike in the finite word case, ω-language inclusion is not “reached” by the simu-
lations {∀di, de, f}. See Figure 2(b) and Appendix C.
Theorem 5. For any x ∈ {∀di, de, f}, there exist an automaton Q and states q0, s0 ∈
Q s.t. Lω(q0) ⊆ Lω(s0), but q0 6⊑x(n,n) s0.
The Miyano-Hayashi construction The Miyano-Hayashi (MH) construction [10] is a
subset-like construction for ABAs which removes universal non-determinism, i.e., it
performs the de-universalization of ω-automata. The idea is similar to the analogous
construction over finite words, with extra bookkeeping needed for recording visits to
accepting states, which may occur not simultaneously for different runs. A set of obli-
gations is maintained, encoding the requirement that, independently of how universal
non-determinism is resolved, an accepting state has to be eventually reached. There
is a tight relationship between these obligations and fair multipebble simulation. For
an ABA Q, let Qnd be the de-universalized automaton obtained by applying the MH-
construction. (See also Definition 3 in Appendix C.1.)
The following lemma says that the MH-construction produces an automaton which
is (n, 1)-fair-simulation equivalent to the original one, and this result is “tight” in the
sense that it does not hold for either direct, or delayed simulation.
Lemma 3. For any ABA Q, let Qnd be the NBA obtained according to the Miyano-
Hayashi de-universalization procedure applied to Q. Then,
a) Q ⊑x(n,1) Qnd, for x ∈ {f, ∀di}, and a’) ∃ automatonQ1 s.t. Q1 6⊑de(n,1) Q1nd,
b) Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Q, and b’) ∃ automatonQ2 s.t. Q2nd 6⊑x(1,1) Q2, for x ∈ {de, ∀di}.
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a
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q31
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q32
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s0
s1
a
s2
a
s3
a
a
q0
q11 q12
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a
q22
a
q′31
a
a
q32
a
a
Q1 6⊑
de
(n,1) Qnd 6⊑
{∀di,de}
(1,1) Q
2
Fig. 3. An example showing automata Q1 and Q2 s.t. Q1 6⊑de(n,1) Qnd (n = 2 suffices), and
Qnd 6⊑
x
(1,1) Q
2 for x ∈ {∀di,de}. The only difference between Q1 and Q2 is the state q31 being
accepting in the former and q′31 being non-accepting in the latter. Notice that Q1nd = Q2nd = Qnd.
The states in Qnd are: s0 = ({q0}, {q0}), s1 = ({q11, q12}, {q12}), s2 = ({q21, q22}, ∅),
s3 = ({q31, q32}, {q32}).
Since fair simulation implies language inclusion, Q and Qnd have the same lan-
guage. This constitutes an alternative proof of correctness for the MH-construction.
The MH-construction “preserves” fair simulation in the following sense.
Lemma 4. Let Q,S be two ABAs. Then, Q ⊑f(n,1) S ⇐⇒ Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Snd.
Remark 3. A weaker version of the “only if” direction of Lemma 4 above, namely
Q ⊑f(1,1) S =⇒ Qnd ⊑
f
(1,1) Snd (notice the (1, 1) in the premise), had already appeared
in [4]. The same statement for both direct and delayed simulation is false, unlike as
incorrectly claimed in [4]. In fact, it can be shown (with an example similar to Figure 3)
that there exist automata Q and S s.t. Q ⊑x(1,1) S, but Qnd 6⊑x(1,1) Snd, with x ∈
{di, de}. Finally, the “if” direction of Lemma 4 can only be established in the context
of multiple pebbles, and it is new.
Transitivity. While most (k1, k2)-simulations are not transitive, some limit cases are.
By defining a notion of join for (1, n)- and (n, 1)-strategies (see Appendix C.2), we
establish that (1, n) and (n, 1) simulations are transitive.
Theorem 6. Let Q be an ABA with n states, and let x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. Then, ⊑x(1,n) and
⊑x(n,1) are transitive.
Remark 4 (Difficulties for (n, n) transitivity.). We did consider transitivity for (n, n)-
simulations on ABA, but found two major issues there. The first issue concerns directly
the definition of the join of two (n, n)-strategies, and this holds for any x ∈ {∀di, de, f}:
The so-called “puppeteering technique”, currently used for defining the join for (1, n)-
and (n, 1)-strategies, requires to maintain several games, and to pipe the output from
one game to the input of one or more other games. This creates a notion of dependency
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between different games. For (1, n) and (n, 1), there are no cyclic dependencies, and we
were able to define the joint strategy. However, for (n, n)-simulations, there are cyclic
dependencies, and it is not clear how the joint strategy should be defined.
The second issue arises from the fact that we further require that the join of two
winning strategies is itself a winning strategy. Therefore, the joint strategy needs to
carry an invariant which implies the x-winning condition, for x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. While
such an invariant for x = ∀di is straightforward, it is not clear what the correct invariant
should be for either delayed or fair simulation.
5 Quotienting
In the following we discuss how multipebble simulation preorders can be used for state-
space reduction of alternating automata, i.e., we discuss under which notions of quotient
the quotient automaton recognizes the same language as the original one.
Let Q = (Q,Σ, qI , ∆,E, U, F ) be an alternating automaton, over finite or infinite
words. Let be any binary relation on Q, and let≈ be the induced equivalence, defined
as ≈=∗ ∩(∗)−1. [·] : Q 7→ [Q] is the function that maps each element q ∈ Q to the
equivalence class [q] ∈ [Q] it belongs to, i.e., [q] := {q′ | q ≈ q′}. We overload [P ] on
sets P ⊆ Q by taking the set of equivalence classes.
In all the notions of quotients that will be defined, only the transition relation varies.
Thus, we gather the common part under a quotient skeleton. We define the quotient
skeleton Q≈ = ([Q], Σ, [qI ], ∆≈, E′, U ′, F ′) as follows: E′ := [E], U ′ := [Q] \ E′ =
{ [q] | [q] ⊆ U } and F ′ = [F ]. We leave ∆≈ unspecified at this time, as it will have
different concrete instantiations later. Notice that mixed classes, i.e., classes containing
both existential and universal states, are declared existential.
The following definitions are borrowed from [4]. We say that q′ ∈ ∆(q, a) is a k-
x-minimal a-successor of q iff there there is no strictly ⊑x(1,k)-smaller a-successor of q,
i.e., for any q′′ ∈ ∆(q, a), q′′ ⊑x(1,k) q
′ implies q′ ⊑x(1,k) q
′′
. Similarly, q′ ∈ ∆(q, a) is
a k-x-maximal a-successor of q iff for any q′′ ∈ ∆(q, a), q′ ⊑x(1,k) q′′ implies q′′ ⊑x(1,k)
q′. Let mink ,xa (q)/maxk ,xa (q) be the set of minimal/maximal successors.
5.1 Finite words
Let  be any preorder which implies language inclusion over finite words, i.e., q 
s =⇒ Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s). In particular, one can take = (⊑∃di(k1,k2))
∗
, or even  equal
to language inclusion itself. As before, let ≈ be the equivalence induced by . It is
well known that automata over finite words can be quotiented w.r.t. any preorder which
implies language equivalence. Here, we show that not all transitions are needed, and that
is is sufficient to consider -maximal successors of existential states and -minimal
successors of universal states. We define the minimax [4] quotient automaton Qm≈ by
instantiating the quotient skeleton (see Section 5) with transition relation ∆≈ := ∆m≈,
where ([q], a, [q′]) ∈ ∆m≈ iff either
– [q] ∈ E′ and ∃ q̂ ∈ [q] ∩E, q̂′ ∈ [q′] s.t. (q̂, a, q̂′) ∈ ∆ ∧ q̂′ ∈ maxa (q̂), or
– [q] ∈ U ′ and ∃ q̂ ∈ [q], q̂′ ∈ [q′] s.t. (q̂, a, q̂′) ∈ ∆ and q̂′ ∈ mina (q̂).
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Notice that transitions from universal states in mixed classes are ignored altogether.
Lemma 5. LetQ be any alternating finite automaton, and let be any preorder which
implies finite-language inclusion. Then, for any q ∈ Q, Lfin(q) = Lfin([q]m).
5.2 Infinite words
Unlike for finite words, it is well known that quotienting ω-automata w.r.t. ω-language-
equivalence does not preserve the ω-language. It has even been shown that quotienting
w.r.t. (1, 1)-fair (bi)simulation does not preserve the ω-language either [6, 3]. Therefore,
one has to look for finer simulations, like delayed or direct simulation. Notice that
multipebble existential-direct simulation cannot be used for quotienting, since it does
not even imply ω-language inclusion—see Theorem 3.
Theorem 7. For any k1, k2 ∈ N>0 and x ∈ {∃di, f} there exists an ABA Q s.t.
Lω(Q) 6= Lω(Q≈), with ≈:=≈x(k1,k2). For x = ∃di, k1 and k2 must not be both equal
to 1. (Note that ≈∃di(1,1)-quotienting does preserve the ω-language.)
Thus, in the following we concentrate on universal-direct and delayed simulation.
Minimax quotients for universal-direct simulation. In [4] it has been shown that mini-
max quotients preserve the ω-language (for direct simulation), and that one can consider
just maximal/minimal successors of existential/universal states, respectively. Here, we
improve this notion, by showing that, when considering multiple-pebbles, it is not
needed to consider every maximal successor of existential states, but it is safe to dis-
card those maximal successors which are (1, k)-simulated by a k-set of other maximal
successors. This suggests the following definition: For q̂ ∈ E, a ∈ Σ and k > 0, we
say that q̂′ is a set of k-maximal representatives for a-successors of q̂ iff
q̂′ ⊆ maxk ,∀dia (q̂) ∧
(
∀q′′ ∈
(
maxk ,∀dia (q̂) \ q̂
′
)
. ∃q̂′′ ∈ 2bq
′,k. q′′ ⊑∀di(1,k) q̂
′′
)
(4)
Notice that the above definition is non-deterministic, in the sense that there might be
different sets of maximal representatives: In this case, one can just take any ⊆-minimal
set satisfying Equation 4. In the following, we assume that a set of maximal represen-
tatives q̂′ has been selected for any q̂ ∈ E and a ∈ Σ.
We define the minimax+ quotient automaton Qm+≈ by instantiating the quotient
skeleton (see Section 5) with transition relation ∆≈ := ∆m+≈ , which differs from ∆m≈
just for existential and mixed classes: ([q], a, [q′]) ∈ ∆m+≈ with [q] ∈ E′ iff
– there exist q̂ ∈ [q] ∩ E and q̂′ ∈ [q′] s.t. (q̂, a, q̂′) ∈ ∆ and q̂′ ∈ q̂′, where q̂′ is a
fixed set of k-maximal representatives for a-successors of q̂, as defined above.
Our definition of minimax+ quotient differs from the one in [4] also w.r.t. the treat-
ment of mixed classes, as discussed in the following remarks.
Remark 5. While in [4] universal states in mixed classes do induce transitions (to min-
imal elements), in our definition we ignore these transitions altogether. In the setting of
(1, 1)-simulations these two definitions coincide, as they are shown in [4] to yield ex-
actly the same transitions, but this needs not be the case in our setting: In the context of
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multiple-pebbles, one minimal transition from a universal state qU might be subsumed
by no single transition from some existential state qE in the same class, but it is always
the case that qE has a set of transitions which together subsume the one from qU (cf.
Lemma 15 in Appendix D.3). In this case, we show that one can in fact always discard
the transitions from qU . Thus, in the context of multiple-pebbles, minimax+ quotients
result in less transitions than just minimax quotients from [4].
Remark 6. While minimax mixed classes are deterministic when considering (1, 1)-
simulations [4], this is not necessarily true when multiple pebbles are used.
Theorem 8. q ≈∀di(1,n) [q]m+, where the quotient is taken w.r.t. the transitive closure of
⊑∀di(1,k), for any k such that 1 ≤ k ≤ n. In particular, Lω(q) = Lω([q]m+).
Semielective quotients for delayed simulation. It has been shown in [4] that minimax
quotients w.r.t (1, 1)-delayed simulation on ABA do not preserve the ω-language. The
reason is that taking just maximal successors of existential states is incorrect for delayed
simulation, since a visit to an accepting state might only occur by performing a non-
maximal transition. (This is not the case with direct simulation, where if a simulation-
smaller state is accepting, then every bigger state is accepting too.) This motivates the
definition of semielective quotients [4], which are like minimax quotients, with the only
difference that every transition induced by existential states is considered, not just maxi-
mal ones. Except for that, all previous remarks still apply. In particular, in mixed classes
in semielective quotients it is necessary to ignore non-minimal transitions from univer-
sal states—the quotient automaton would recognize a bigger language otherwise.
While for the (1, 1)-simulations on ABA in [4] it is actually possible to ignore tran-
sitions from universal states in mixed classes altogether (see Remark 5), in the context
of multiple-pebbles this is actually incorrect, as shown in Figure 5, Appendix D.3. The
reason is similar as why non-maximal transitions from existential states cannot be dis-
carded: This might prevent accepting states from being visited. We define the semiel-
elective+ quotient automatonQse+≈ by instantiating the quotient skeleton (see Section 5)
with ∆≈ := ∆se+≈ , where
([q], a, [q′])∈∆se+≈ ⇐⇒ (q, a, q
′)∈∆ and either q∈E, or q∈U and q′∈minn,dea (q)
Theorem 9. q ≈de(1,n) [q]se+, where the quotient is taken w.r.t. ⊑de(1,n). In particular,
Lω(q) = Lω([q]se+).
Remark 7. It is surprising that, unlike for NBA [2], quotienting ABA w.r.t. (1, k)-de
simulations, for 1 < k < n, does not preserve the language of the automaton in general.
The problem is again in the mixed classes, where minimal transitions from universal
states can be selected only by looking at the full (1, n)-simulation. See the counterex-
ample in Figure 4, where the dashed transition is present in the (1, k)-quotient, despite
being non-(1, n)-minimal.
Remark 8. Semielective multipebble quotients can achieve arbitrarily high compres-
sion ratios relative to semielective 1-pebble quotients, (multipebble-)direct minimax
quotients and mediated preorder quotients [1] (see Figure 6 in Appendix D.3).
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(1,2) qe
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(1,3) q1
q0 6⊑
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(1,2) q1
q1 6⊑
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(1,3) q0
Fig. 4. (1, k)-semielective+ quotients on ABA do not preserve the ω-language for 1 < k < n in
general. Let k = 2. The only two (1, k)/(1, n)-equivalent states are qu and qe, and in the quotient
they form a mixed class. q1 is not a (1, n)-minimal a-successor of qu, but it is a (1, k)-minimal
successor for k = 2. Thus, the only difference between the (1, n)- and (1, k)-semielective+
quotients is that the dashed transition is (correctly) not included in the former, but (incorrectly)
included in the latter. Thus the (1, k)-semielective+ quotient automaton would incorrectly accept
the word w = aaeaω 6∈ Lω(qI) = aaa{b+ c+ d}aω .
6 Solving Multipebble Simulation Games
In this section we show how to solve the multipebble simulation games previously de-
fined. We encode each simulation game into a 2-player game-graph with an ω-regular
winning condition. In the game-graph, Eve will take the roˆle of Duplicator, and Adam
the one of Spoiler. A game-graph is a tuple G = 〈VE, VA,→〉, where nodes in VE be-
long to Eve (mimicking Duplicator), and nodes in VA belong to Adam (mimicking
Spoiler). Transitions are represented by elements in →⊆ (VE × VA ∪ VA × VE), where
we write p → q for (p, q) ∈→. Notice that the two players strictly alternate while
playing, i.e., the game graph is bipartite. We write V for VE ∪ VA. We introduce the
following monotone operator on 2VA : For any x ⊆ VA, cpre(x) := {v0 ∈ VA | ∀v1 ∈
VE. (v0 → v1 =⇒ ∃v2 ∈ x. v1 → v2)}, i.e., cpre(x) is the set of nodes where Eve
can force the game into x.
We define various game-graphs for solving simulations. We express the winning
region of Eve as a µ-calculus fixpoint expression over VA [8], which can then be evalu-
ated using standard fixpoint algorithms. We derive the desired complexity upper bounds
using the following fact:
Lemma 6. Let e be a fixpoint expression over a graph V , with |V | ∈ nO(k). Then, for
any fixed k ∈ N, evaluating e can be done in time polynomial in n.
For solving direct and fair simulation, we refer the reader to Appendix E. Here, we
consider just delayed simulation, which is the most difficult (and interesting).
The natural starting point for defining Gde is the definition in [2] of the game-graph
for computing (1, k)-simulations for NBAs. Unfortunately, the game-graph in [2] is
actually incorrect: According to the definition of delayed simulation (cf. Section 2),
every new obligation encountered when the left side is accepting at some round should
be independently satisfied by the right side, which has to be good since that round. Now,
the algorithm in [2] just tries to satisfy the most recent obligation, which overrides
all the previous ones. This is an issue: If the left side is continuously accepting, for
example, then the right side might simply have not enough time to satisfy any obligation
at all. Therefore, [2] actually computes an under-approximation to delayed simulation.
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We overcome this difficulty by explictly bookkeeping all pending constraints. This
leads to the following definitions. The game-graph for delayed simulation is Gde =
〈V deE , V
de
A ,→
de〉, where nodes in V deA are of the form v(q,Bad,s,Good), and nodes in V deE
of the form v(q,Bad,s,Good,a,q′,s′), with q,q′, s, s′ ⊆ Q. Bad = 〈b1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ bm1〉 and
Good = 〈g1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ gm2〉 are two sequences of sets of states from Q, strictly ordered
by set-inclusion, which are used to keep track of multiple obligations.
Intuitively, Bad is used to detect when new constraints should be created, i.e., to
detect when every Left pebble is universally good since some previous round. At each
round, a new set of bad pebbles b = q \ F is added to Bad. When accepting states
are visited by Left pebbles, they are discarded from every set b ∈ Bad. When some
b becomes eventually empty, this means that, at the current round, all Left pebbles are
universally good since some previous round: At this point, b is removed from Bad, and
we say that the red light flashes.
The sequence Good represents a set of constraints to be eventually satisfied. Each
g ∈ Good is a set of good pebbles, which we require to “grow” until it becomes equal to
s. When Good = ∅, there is no pending constraint. Constraints are added to Good when
the red light flashes (see above): In this case, we update Good by adding the new empty
constraint g = ∅. When accepting states are visited by Right pebbles, we upgrade every
constraint g ∈ Good by adding accepting states. Completed constraints g = s are then
removed from Good, and we say that the green light flashes.
Lemma 7.
∣∣V de∣∣ ≤ 2·(n+1)2(k1+k2) ·(1 + (k1 + 1)k1+1)·(1 + 2(k2 + 1)k2+1)·|Σ|.
Transitions in Gde are defined as follows. For any (q, s, a,q′′, s′′) ∈ Γ Sp, we have
v(q,Bad,s,Good) →
de v(q,Bad,s,Good,a,q′′,s′′), and for (q, s, a,q′′, s′′,q′, s′) ∈ ΓDup, we
have v(q,Bad,s,Good,a,q′′,s′′) →de v(q′,Bad′,s′,Good′), where Bad′,Good′ are computed
according to Algorithm 1 in Appendix E.3.
We have that Eve wins iff every red flash is matched by at least one green flash,
and different red flashes are matched by different green ones. This can be checked by
verifying that infinitely often either Good = ∅ or s ∈ Good, i.e., it is not the case
that Good contains a constraint that it is not eventually “completed” and discarded. Let
T = {v(q,Bad,s,Good) | Good = ∅ ∨ s ∈ Good}, and define the initial configuration as
vI =
{
v(q,{q\F},s,∅) if q \ F 6= ∅
v(q,∅,s,{s∩F}) otherwise
q ⊑dek1,k2 s iff T is visited infinitely often iff vI ∈W
de = νxµy (cpre(y) ∪ T ∩ cpre(x)).
Theorem 10. For any fixed k1, k2 ∈ N, x ∈ {∀di, ∃di, de, f} and sets q, s ⊆ Q,
deciding whether q ⊑x(k1,k2) s can be done in polynomial time.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
Transitivity for (n, n)-simulations. As discussed at the end of Section 4, composing
(n, n) (winning) strategies is apparently much more difficult than in the (1, n) and
(n, 1) case. We conjecture that all types of (n, n)-simulations discussed in this paper
are transitive, and showing this would conceivably solve the join problem as well.
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Quotienting with (n, 1)- and (n, n)-simulations. While we have dealt with (1, n)-
quotients, we have not considered (n, 1)- or (n, n)-quotients. For the latter, one should
first solve the associated transitivity problem, and, for both, an appropriate notion of
semielective-quotient has to be provided. We have shown that this is already a non-
trivial task for (1, n)-simulations on ABA.
Future directions. Our work on delayed simulation has shown that several general-
izations are possible. In particular, two issues need to be addressed. The first is the
complexity of the structure of the game-graph needed for computing delayed simula-
tion. A possible generalization of delayed simulation involving looser “synchronization
requirements” between obligations and their satisfaction might result in simpler game-
graphs. The second issue concerns Lemmas 3 and 4: We would like to find a weaker
delayed-like simulation for which the counterexample shown there does not hold. This
would give a better understanding of the MH-construction.
As in [3], it is still open to find a hierarchy of (k1, k2)-multipebble simulations
converging to ω-language inclusion when k1 = k2 = n.
Acknowledgment. We thank K. Etessami and C. Fritz for helpful discussions, and an
anonymous referee for suggesting the comparison to mediated preorder [1].
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A Preliminaries (Section 2)
Theorem 1. Let x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f} and k′1 ≥ k1, k′2 ≥ k2.
1. Inclusion: ⊑x(k1,k2) ⊆ ⊑
x
(k′
1
,k′
2
). (In particular, x(k1,k2)⊆x(k′1,k′2).)
2. Strictness: If k′1 > k1 or k′2 > k2, there exists an automatonQ′ s.t.⊑x(k1,k2) 6=⊑x(k′1,k′2).
Proof. 1. This follows directly from the definitions, since having more pebbles can
only help Duplicator, who is always allowed to take pebbles away.
2. For showing the strictness of the inclusion, consider the example in Figure 1, for
any kind of simulation x ∈ {o, ∃di, ∀di, de, f}. This example shows that Duplicator
wins by “hedging her bets” on both sides, using 2 pebbles on the left and 3 pebbles
on the right. Hence, q ⊑x(2,3) s holds.
To see that the 2 Left pebbles are necessary, it sufficies to note that if there were only
one Left pebble, then Spoiler could choose either b1 or b2, and every Right pebble
would get stuck. But with two Left pebbles, Spoiler can no longer play either b1 or
b2, since one Left pebble would get stuck, which would be winning for Duplicator.
A similar reasoning for the symbols {c1, c2, c3} shows that 3 Right pebbles are
neccessary and sufficient for Duplicator to win the game.
It is easy to generalize Figure 1 to more pebbles (k1, k2). Moreover, a similar ex-
ample can be crafted without using the stuckness condition, but using only the
acceptance condition.
⊓⊔
Twe following two observations will be useful in later proofs: When pebbles are
good infinitely often, then it is the case that they are always good, as stated below.
Lemma 8. Let π = q0q1 . . . be any sequence of k-sets. Then,(
good∃(π,∞) =⇒ ∀i ≥ 0. good∃(qi)
)
∧
(
good∀(π,∞) =⇒ ∀i ≥ 0. good∀(qi)
)
.
The following is a consequence of Ko¨nig’s Lemma:
Lemma 9. Let π = s0s1 . . . be an infinite sequence of k-sets. If good∃(π,∞), then
there exists an infinite path πacc = p0p1 . . . s.t. 1) for any i, pi ∈ si, and 2) for infinitely
many i’s, pi ∈ F .
Proof. We make use of Ko¨nig’s Lemma: We build an infinite tree which is finitely
branching, hence by Ko¨nig’s Lemma there exists an infinite path πacc starting from the
root, and we show that this path contains infinitely many accepting states. First, we
extract a subsequence {s′j}j≥0 from {si}i≥0, as follows: s′j := sij , where i0 = 0 and,
inductively, ij is the least index i > ij−1 s.t. good∃(si, ij−1). It follows that, for any
j > 0, good∃(s′j , ij−1). For any state r ∈ s′j there is a node v(r, j) at level j ≥ 0
in the tree. (For example, the root of the tree is v(s, 0), where s is the only state in
s′0 = s0 = {s}.) The parenthood relation between nodes is defined as follows: We have
that, for any r ∈ s′j+1, there exists r′ ∈ s′j s.t. there exists a path from r′ to r which
visits at least one accepting state. In this case, v(r, j + 1) is a children of v(r′, j). This
tree is infinite and finitely branching. Moreover, the infinite path πacc, whose existence
is guaranteed by Ko¨nig’s Lemma, visits accepting states infinitely often. ⊓⊔
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B Section 3
Lemma 1. For any automatonQ with n states, and states q, s ∈ Q:
1. q ⊑∃di(k1,k2) s implies L
fin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s), for any k1, k2 ∈ N>0.
2. q ⊑o(k1,k2) s implies Tr(q) ⊆ Tr(s), for any k1, k2 ∈ N>0.
3. Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s) implies q ⊑∃di(n,n) s, provided that Q is complete.
4. Tr(q) ⊆ Tr(s) implies q ⊑o(n,n) s, provided that Q is complete.
In particular, the last two points above show that existential-direct (resp., ordinary)
simulation “reaches” language inclusion (resp., trace inclusion) at (n, n).
Proof. Point 2) follows from Point 1), and Point 4) follows from Point 3), since when
the set of accepting state is the full set of states, i.e., F = Q, ordinary and direct
simulation coincide, and the trace language equals the finite language in this case.
For Points 1) and 3), we defer their proof at the end of the next section. ⊓⊔
B.1 Subset constructions
Below, we give a formal definition for the de-existentialization and de-universalization
procedures for AFAs.
Definition 1. Given an AFA Q = (Q,Σ, qI , ∆, F,E, U) with |Q| = n, the existential
n-subset construction yields a purely universal finite automata
S∃(Q) := (Q′, Σ, {qI}, ∆
′, F ′, E′, U ′) ,
where Q′ := 2Q, F ′ := {P ∈ Q′ | P ∩ F 6= ∅}, E′ := ∅, U ′ := Q′, and the transition
relation ∆′ ⊆ 2Q ×Σ × 2Q satisfies: (P, a,R) ∈ ∆′ iff there exists a choice function
select : P ∩ U × Σ 7→ Q which fixes an element in ∆(p, a) for any universal state
p ∈ P ∩ U , and R =
⋃
p∈P∩E ∆(p, a) ∪ {select(p, a) | p ∈ P ∩ U}.
Intuitively, the choice function select resolves the universal choice, and then we take
the union over all possible resolutions of the existential choice.
Definition 2. Given an AFA Q = (Q,Σ, qI , ∆, F,E, U) with |Q| = n, the universal
n-subset construction yields a purely existential finite automata
S∀(Q) := (Q′, Σ, {qI}, ∆
′, F ′, E′, U ′) ,
where Q′ := 2Q, F ′ := {P ∈ Q′ | P ⊆ F}, E′ := Q′, U ′ := ∅, and (P, a,R) ∈ ∆′ iff
there exists a choice function select : P ∩E×Σ 7→ Q which fixes an element in ∆(p, a)
for any existential state p ∈ P ∩ E, and R = ⋃p∈P∩U ∆(p, a) ∪ {select(p, a) | p ∈
P ∩ E}.
Lemma 2. Let Q1,Q2 be two AFAs over the same alphabet Σ, with |Q1| = n1 and
|Q2| = n2. Then, for any k1 ≤ n1 and k2 ≤ n2,
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(k1,n2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ Q1 ⊑
∃di
(k1,1)
S∃(Q2) (S1)
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(n1,k2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ S
∀(Q1) ⊑
∃di
(1,k2)
Q2 (S2)
Q1 ⊑
∃di
(n1,n2)
Q2 ⇐⇒ S
∀(Q1) ⊑
∃di
(1,1) S
∃(Q2) . (S3)
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Proof. First notice that Equation (S3) follows by subsequent application of (S1) and
(S2). For Equation (S1), the idea is that maximally splitting pebbles on existential states
inQ2 is exactly the same as moving the only pebble in S∃(Q2). More formally, one can
show how to mantain the following invariant: 〈q1,q2〉 is the current configuration in the
(k1, n2)-game on the left iff 〈q1, {q2}〉 is the current configuration in the (k1, 1)-game
on the right. From the invariant, the winning condition is easily verified: If q1 ⊆ F ,
then q2 ∩F 6= ∅, which is the same as saying q2 ∈ F ′, where F ′ is the set of accepting
states in S∃(Q2). Equation (S2) is proved similarly. ⊓⊔
Proof (of Lemma 1). We first prove Point 1), i.e., q ⊑∃di(k1,k2) s implies Lfin(q) ⊆
Lfin(s). LetQ1 and Q2 be two disjoint copies of Q, where the initial states are, respec-
tively, q and s. By definition, q ⊑∃di(k1,k2) s iff Q1 ⊑
∃di
(k1,k2)
Q2. Since Q1 ⊑∃di(k1,k2) Q2
implies Q1 ⊑∃di(n1,n2) Q2, then by Equation (S3), one has S∀(Q1) ⊑∃di(1,1) S∃(Q2). But
⊑∃di(1,1) is known to imply language inclusion [4], henceLfin(S∀(Q1)) ⊆ Lfin(S∃(Q2)).
Finally, since the subset constructions are language-preserving (this follows from their
correctness), Lfin(Q1) ⊆ Lfin(Q2), implying Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s).
For Point 3), the crucial observation is that S∀(Q1) ⊑∃di(1,1) S∃(Q2) is equivalent
to language inclusion, since S∀(Q1) is a purely existential automaton and S∃(Q2) is a
purely universal automaton, hence only Spoiler plays. Thus, Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin(s) implies
S∀(Q1) ⊑∃di(1,1) S
∃(Q2), and, by Equation (S3), Q1 ⊑∃di(n,n) Q2, i.e., q ⊑∃di(n,n) s. ⊓⊔
C Section 4
Theorem 4. For x∈{∀di, de, f}, automatonQ, k1, k2 ∈ N>0 and states q, s ∈ Q,
q ⊑x(k1,k2) s implies L
ω(q) ⊆ Lω(s) .
Proof. It suffices to prove the claim for k1 = k2 = n = |Q|, since, by Theorem 1,
(n, n)-simulation contains (k1, k2)-simulation. Similarly, by the containment between
universal-direct, delayed and fair simulation established in Theorem 2, it is sufficient
to consider just fair simulation, which is the coarsest. Let w = a0a1 · · · ∈ Lω(q) be a
word in Lω(q). We have to showw ∈ Lω(s). Let Gsim = G(n,n)(q, s) be the simulation
game between q and s, let Gacc0 = Gω(q, w) be the acceptance game for w from state
q, and let Gacc1 = Gω(s, w) be the acceptance game for w from state s.
In order to show w ∈ Lω(s), we use the winning strategy of Duplicator in Gsim and
the information in Gacc0 to witness the existence of a winning strategy for Automaton in
Gacc1 . We use the so-called “puppeteering technique” to coordinate the various games.
There are two “real players”, the Automaton (A1) and Pathfinder (P1) players in Gacc1 ,
and four “puppet players”, which are controlled by A1:
– The Duplicator (D) and Spoiler (S) puppets in the simulation game Gsim.
– The Automaton (A0) and Pathfinder (P0) puppets in the acceptance game Gacc0 .
The orchestration job of A1 is complicated by the fact that in the simulation game
Gsim multiple Left and Right pebbles may be present in any given round. Henceforth,
A1 mantains a family of acceptance games, depending on the current configuration of
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the simulation game. The flow of information between the various acceptance games
and the simulation game is shown below.
G
acc
0,E
A0
SLeft
G
acc
0,U
Gsim
DLeft
P0
DRight
A1
Gacc1,U P1
SRight
Gacc1,E
The meaning of the picture is the following. Recall that in Gsim, Duplicator is allowed to
“hedge her bets”, i.e., to split pebbles, on universal Left states and on existential Right
states. Every time D splits Left universal pebbles, a new acceptance game in Gacc0 is
spawned, and D’s choices in Gsim are mimicked by P0 in Gacc0 . Similarly, whenD splits
Right existential pebbles, a new acceptance game in Gacc1 is spawned, and D’s choice
in Gsim is mimicked by A1 in Gacc1 . This is represented by the r.h.s. of the figure above.
Symmetrically, the other side represents S’s behaviour, which moves Left existential
pebbles copying A0, and Right universal pebbles copying P1.
The correctness is guaranteed by the fact that, sinceA0 is playing a winning strategy
in every Gacc0 game, then regardless of universal choices in Gacc0 , the resulting run will
visit accepting states infinitely often. Thus, by construction, Left pebbles in Gsim are
universally good infinitely often, and, since D is playing a winning strategy for fair
simulation, Right pebbles are existentially good infinitely often. We won’t explicitly
define A1’s winning strategy for accepting w in Gacc1 , but, using Lemma 9 (which relies
on Ko¨nig’s Lemma) we will show that one such strategy does exist: Indeed, since Right
pebbles are existentially good infinitely often, by Lemma 9, there exists an accepting
run for w in Gacc1 , which witnesses the existence of a winning strategy for A1.
For bookkeeping the state of the various simulation games, we use a logbook. As-
sume that, at round i, the current partial play in Gsim is
πi = 〈q0, s0〉 . . . 〈qi, si〉 ,
with q0 = {q} and s0 = {s}, and that the remaining input word to be read is wi =
aiai+1 . . . . Then, a logbook Li = (L0i , L1i ) for round i is a pair of finite sets of partial
plays from Gacc0 and Gacc1 , respectively, where
∣∣L0i ∣∣ = j0i , ∣∣L1i ∣∣ = j1i and
L0i = {π
0
i,j := 〈q0,j , w0〉 . . . 〈qi,j , wi〉 | 1 ≤ j ≤ j
0
i }, and
L1i = {π
1
i,j := 〈s0,j , w0〉 . . . 〈si,j , wi〉 | 1 ≤ j ≤ j
1
i }
(with 〈r, wi〉we mean that in the language acceptance game the current state is r and the
remaining input word is wi). We say that Li is valid if it further satisfies the following
logbook properties:
qi = {qi,1, . . . , qi,j0
i
} (LP0)
si = {si,1, . . . , si,j1
i
} (LP1)
∀π0i,j ∈ L
0
i . π
0
i,j is a A0-conform partial play, (LP2)
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i.e., (LP0) and (LP1) say that the logbook is correctly “synchronized” with the simula-
tion game, and (LP2) says that every π0i,j is built applying A0’s winning strategy.
Inductively, A1 ensures that a valid logbook at round i is updated into a valid log-
book in the next round i + 1. In the first round i = 0, the initial Gsim-configuration is
〈q0, s0〉 = 〈{q}, {s}〉, and the two acceptance games Gacc0 and Gacc1 are in 〈q, w〉 and
〈s, w〉, respectively. Clearly, L0 = (L00, L10) with L00 = {〈q, w〉} and L10 = {〈s, w〉} is
a valid logbook.
Assume that Li is a valid logbook for round i, that the current configuration of the
simlulation game is 〈qi, si〉, and that these two sets are partitioned into existential and
universal states, in the following way:
qi = {q
E
i,1, . . . , q
E
i,j0
E
} ∪ {qUi,1, . . . , q
U
i,j0
U
} and si = {sEi,1, . . . , sE1,j1
E
} ∪ {sUi,1, . . . , s
U
1,j1
U
}
(Notice that j0E + j0U = j0i and j1E + j1U = j1i .) The next input symbol in Gsim is
determined by the remaining input word wi = aiai+1 . . . , and it is equal to ai. I.e., A1
makes the S puppet choose ai as the next input symbol in the simulation game Gsim,
and the remaining input for the next round is wi+1 = ai+1ai+2 . . . . For determining
the next Gsim-configuration 〈qi+1, si+1〉, as well as updating the logbook to Li+1 =
(L0i+1, L
1
i+1), A1 orchestrates the various puppets according to the following steps.
1. The A0 puppet moves from existential Gacc0 -configurations 〈qEi,1, wi〉 . . . 〈qEi,j0
E
, wi〉
according to her winning strategy in Gacc0 . Notice that all such pebbles in qEi can
be moved to some ai-successor, since 1)w ∈ Lω(q), and 2) different Left states are
the result of different past choices at universal Left states, hence all states qEi,j ∈ qEi
acceptwi (in fact, all states in qi). In this way, an ai-successor q(E)i+1,j is built for ev-
ery qEi,j ∈ qEi . Let q
(E)
i+1 = {q
(E)
i+1,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ j
0
E} be the set of such ai-successors.
For any qEi,j ∈ qEi+1 and q
(E)
i+1,j ∈ q
(E)
i+1 s.t. q
(E)
i+1,j ∈ ∆(q
E
i,j , ai), let π0i,j be the par-
tial play in L0i ending in 〈qEi,j , wi〉 (which, by the induction hypothesis, exists by
(LP0)). Then, we add π0i+1,j = π0i,j · 〈q(E)i+1,j , wi+1〉 to L0i+1. This establishes (LP0)
and (LP2) at round i+1 for existential states in qi. (Notice that states in q(E)i+1 need
not be existential, we use the superscript (E) just to record that prececessors were
existential.)
2. Similarly, the P1 puppet chooses a successor for every universal Gacc1 -configurations
〈sUi,1, w
i〉 . . . 〈sU
i,j1
U
, wi〉. Let q(U)i+1 = {s
(U)
i+1,j | 1 ≤ j ≤ j
1
U} be the set of such ai-
successors, if any. Notice that, at this point, one or even all such configurations may
get stuck, i.e., with no ai-successor, and, consequently, q(U)i+1 might be empty. We
need not worry about this now.
3. Then, the S puppet in the simulation game Gsim copies the A0’s and P1’s moves
above, moving from qEi to q
(E)
i+1 and from sUi to s
(U)
i+1.
4. Now, the D puppet moves according to her winning strategy: Pebbles in qUi are
moved to q(U)i+1 (possibly being split for D may hedge her bets), and pebbles in sEi
are moved to s(E)i+1 (possibly being split or thrown away), and the simulation game
goes into state (qi+1, si+1), where qi+1 = q(E)i+1 ∪ q
(U)
i+1, and si+1 ⊆ s
(E)
i+1 ∪ s
(U)
i+1.
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Since D’s strategy is winning, at least one Right pebble can be moved to some
successor. Thus, si+1 6= ∅. D’s move above is copied by the puppte P0 and the
player A1, as specified below.
5. The P0 puppet copies theD puppet’s move from qUi to q
(U)
i+1: For any qUi,j ∈ qUi and
q
(U)
i+1,j ∈ q
(U)
i+1 ∩∆(q
U
i,j , ai), we add π0i+1,j = π0i,j · 〈q
(U)
i+1,j , wi+1〉 to L
0
i+1, where
π0i,j is the partial play ending in 〈qUi,j , wi〉, which exists by (LP0). This establishes
(LP0) and (LP2) for universal states in qi.
6. Finaly, the A1 player in the family of acceptance games Gacc1 copies the D puppet’s
move from sEi to s
(E)
i+1: For any sEi,j ∈ sEi s.t. s
(E)
i+1,j ∈ s
(E)
i+1 ∩ ∆(s
E
i,j , ai), we
add π1i+1,j = π1i,j · 〈s
(E)
i+1,j , wi+1〉 to L
1
i+1, where π1i,j is the partial play ending in
〈sEi,j , wi〉, which exists by (LP1). We also update the logbook for universal states in
si which were not discarded in the previous step 2.: For any sUi,j ∈ sUi s.t. s
(U)
i+1,j ∈
s
(U)
i+1 ∩∆(s
U
i,j , ai), we add π1i+1,j = π1i,j · 〈s
(U)
i+1,j , wi+1〉 to L
1
i+1, where π1i,j is the
partial play ending in 〈sUi,j , wi〉, which exists by (LP1). This establishes (LP1) for
the next round i+ 1. (Notice that, since si+1 6= ∅, then L1i+1 contains at least one
partial play.)
Below we argue about the correctness of this construction. Let π = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 . . .
be the resulting infinite play, and let π0 = q0q1 . . . and π1 = s0s1 . . . be its projec-
tions. Since every partial play in L0i is A0-conform (by (LP2)), and the A0 puppet is
playing according to a winning strategy (which exists, sincew ∈ Lω(q)), it follows that,
for every n ≥ 0, there exists i ≥ 0 s.t. every π0i,j ∈ L0i has visited at least n accepting
states. By (LP0) and since no Left pebble is thrown away, we have that good∀(π0,∞).
Since D’s strategy is winning, by the winning condition of fair simulation, we have
good∃(π1,∞). By Lemma 9, there exists an infinite accepting path πacc. Thus, A1 has
a strategy s.t., for any P1’s strategy, there exists a accepting path πacc which is conform
to both strategies. Thus, w ∈ Lω(s). ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. For any x ∈ {∀di, de, f}, there exist an automatonQ and states q0, s0 ∈ Q
s.t. Lω(q0) ⊆ Lω(s0), but q0 6⊑x(n,n) s0.
Proof. By the inclusion between simulations (see Theorem 2), it is enough to consider
fair simulation. Take the example in Figure 2(b). We have that Lω(q0) = Lω(s0) =
aω + a∗bω, hence language inclusion holds between q0 and s0, but, as we shall see, no
Duplicator strategy is winning in the (n, n)-simulation game Gf(n,n)(q0, s0).
This can be seen as follows. Spoiler chooses the a action and we can assume that
Duplicator “hedges her bets” by going in s′ = {s0, s1}. Now, Spoiler keeps looping
on q0 by choosing the a action for an arbitrarily high number of moves. Duplicator can
only reply by staying in a subset of s′. Notice that Duplicator has to eventually take the
pebble on s0 away: Indeed, Spoiler’s pebble in q0 is accepting infinitely often, hence
Duplicator would lose if the pebble on s0 6∈ F is not taken away. When Duplicator takes
the pebble on s0 away, Spoiler plays the b action and Duplicator loses, his remaining
pebble on s1 being stuck. Similar examples may be conceived in which the acceptance
condition, instead of the stuckness condition, is used to show that Duplicator loses. ⊓⊔
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C.1 Infinite words: ABAs and the Miyano-Hayashi construction
Definition 3. Given an ABA Q = (Q,Σ, qI , ∆, F,E, U), the Miyano-Hayashi con-
struction [10] yields a de-universalized NBA
Qnd := (Q
′, Σ, ({qI}, {qI} \ F ), ∆
′, F ′, E′, U ′) ,
where the new set of states Q′ ⊆ 2Q × 2Q (called macrostates) consists of pairs of
subsets of Q, the set of accepting macrostates F ′ satisfies
(P,O) ∈ F ′ ⇐⇒ O = ∅,
i.e., a macrostate is accepting if no obligation is pending, E′ = Q′ and U ′ = ∅,
i.e., Qnd is a purely non-deterministic automaton, and the the transition relation ∆′ ⊆
(2Q×2Q)×Σ×(2Q×2Q) satisfies: ((P,O), a, (P ′, O′)) ∈ ∆′ iff there exists a choice
function select : P ∩ E ×Σ 7→ Q s.t. ∀p ∈ P ∩ E, a ∈ Σ : (p, a, select(p, a)) ∈ ∆
(i.e., select(p, a) fixes an element in ∆(p, a)) such that
P ′ =
⋃
p∈P∩U
∆(p, a) ∪ {select(p, a) | p ∈ P ∩ E} ,
and if O = ∅, then O′ = P ′ \ F , otherwise,
O′ =
( ⋃
o∈O∩U
∆(o, a) ∪ {select(o, a) | p ∈ O ∩ E}
)
\ F .
Lemma 3. For any ABA Q, let Qnd be the NBA obtained according to the Miyano-
Hayashi de-universalization procedure applied to Q. Then,
a) Q ⊑x(n,1) Qnd, for x ∈ {f, ∀di}, and
b) Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Q.
Moreover, there exist automata Q1 and Q2 s.t.
a’) Q1 6⊑de(n,1) Q1nd, and
b’) Q2nd 6⊑x(1,1) Q2, for x ∈ {de, ∀di}.
Proof. We first prove Point a), i.e., Q ⊑f(n,1) Qnd. Intuitively, the strategy of Dupli-
cator is to maximally hedge her bets on Q (i.e., Left universal pebbles), and to select
successors inQnd (which is a purely existential automaton) by copying Spoiler’s moves
from Left existential pebbles in Q. More formally, there exists a strategy for Duplica-
tor which mantains the following invariant: If at round k the current configuration is
〈qk, (q′k,ok)〉, then qk = q′k , i.e., Duplicator has a strategy that mimicks exactly the
MH-construction.
We now argue that this strategy is winning for Duplicator. If some Left pebble gets
stuck, then Duplicator wins. Otherwise, by the properties of the MH-construction, it is
the case that the Right pebble can always be moved; in this case, we argue as follows.
Let π = 〈q0, (q0,o0)〉〈q1, (q1,o1)〉 . . . be the resulting sequence of configurations.
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For x = ∀di, assume that qk ⊆ F . By the definition of the MH-construction ok ⊆
qk ∩ F , hence ok = ∅, i.e., (qk, ∅) ∈ F ′. For x = f , assume that there are infinitely
many i’s s.t. qi is universally good since some previous round ji. Now consider the
sequence of indices {ki}i≥0 defined as follows: k0 = 0, and, inductively, ki+1 is s.t.
qki+1 is good since round ki. (Notice that this sequence is well-defined and infinite:
Since there are infinitely many i’s s.t. qi is universally good since some previous round
ji, by Lemma 8, this implies that for any i, there exists ji ≥ i s.t. qji is universally
good since round i.) We have that, by the definition of the MH-construction, oki = ∅
for any i > 0. Hence, (qki , ∅) ∈ F ′ for infinitely many ki’s.
We now prove Point b), i.e., Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Q. We can assume that the Left peb-
ble never gets stuck, otherwise Duplicator wins trivially. Here, the strategy for Du-
plicator is to maintain the following invariant: If at round k the current configura-
tion is 〈(qk,ok), qk〉, then qk ∈ qk, i.e., Duplicator can force the Right pebble to be
somewhere in qk. Clearly, the invariant holds for the initial configuration: For i = 0,
(q0,o0) = ({qI}, {qI}\F ) and q0 = qI . Inductively, assume that the invariant qk ∈ qk
holds for k ≥ 0. We show how Dupicator can ensure it in the next round k+1. Assume
that Spoiler moves the Left pebble to (qk+1,ok+1) and that the next input symbol is
ak. We have two cases to consider:
– If qk ∈ E, then, by the MH-construction, there exists q′ ∈ qk+1 s.t. q′ ∈ ∆(qk, ak).
In this case, Duplicator moves the Right pebble from qk to qk+1 := q′.
– If qk ∈ U , then, by the MH-construction, it is the case that ∆(qk, ak) ⊆ qk+1.
Hence, Spoiler moves the Right universal pebble qk to any successor qk+1 ∈
∆(qk, ak). For every Spoiler’s move, qk+1 ∈ qk+1.
We now argue that this invariant-preserving strategy is winning for Duplicator. As-
sume that, for infinitely many i’s, (qi,oi) is accepting, i.e., oi = ∅. Hence, we can build
an infinite sequence {ij}j≥0 of indices s.t. oij = ∅ for any j > 0. From the structure
of the MH-construction, it follows that for any j > 0, there exists k s.t. ij−1 < k ≤ ij
and qk ∈ F . Hence, qk is accepting for infinitely many indices k’s.
Points a’) and b’) are actually shown in Figure 3, where we give two automata Q1
and Q2 which results in the same de-universalized automaton, i.e., Q1nd = Q2nd =: Qnd.
For Point a’), the simulation game Gde(n,1)(Q1,Q1nd) results in the (unique) sequence of
configurations
π =〈{q0}, ({q0}, {q0})〉〈{q11, q12}, ({q11, q12}, {q12})〉
〈{q21, q22}, ({q21, q22}, ∅)〉〈{q31, q32}, ({q31, q32}, {q32})〉
ω ,
but at round k = 3, the Left pebbles on {q31, q32} are universally good since round 2
(since q22 and q31 are in F ), but the Right pebble is never accepting for k ≥ 3. For
Point b’), the reasoning is similar, but now q′31 6∈ F . We have that Spoiler can force the
game Gx(1,1)(Q
2
nd,Q
2) in the following sequence of configurations:
π = 〈s0, q0〉〈s1, q11〉〈s2, q21〉〈s3, q
′
31〉
ω ,
s.t., at round k = 2, s2 ∈ F ′, but 1) q21 6∈ F (hence, Q2nd 6⊑x(1,1) Q2 for x = ∀di),
and 2) for no later round k′ ≥ 2, the Right pebble is accepting (in fact, it is trapped in
q′31 6∈ F ), henceQ2nd 6⊑x(1,1) Q2 for x = de. ⊓⊔
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Lemma 4. Let Q,S be two alternating Bu¨chi automata. Then,
Q ⊑f(n,1) S ⇐⇒ Qnd ⊑
f
(1,1) Snd .
Proof. We make use of transitivity, which will established later.
“Only if”. Assume Q ⊑f(n,1) S. Then, by a double application of Lemma 3,
Qnd ⊑
f
(1,1) Q ⊑
f
(n,1) S ⊑
f
(n,1) Snd ,
and, since (1, 1)-simulation is contained in (n, 1)-simulation (see Theorem 1), by tran-
sitivity, we obtain Qnd ⊑f(n,1) Snd. But Qnd is a purely existential automaton, hence
(n, 1)-simulation reduces to (1, 1)-simulation in this case. Thus, Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Snd.
“If”. Assume Qnd ⊑f(1,1) Snd. By Lemma 3,
Q ⊑f(n,1) Qnd ⊑
f
(1,1) Snd ⊑
f
(1,1) S ,
thus, by “upgrading” (1, 1)-simulation to (n, 1), and by transitivity, Q ⊑f(n,1) S. ⊓⊔
C.2 Transitivity
Theorem 6. Let x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. Then,
q ⊑x(1,n) r ∧ r ⊑
x
(1,n) s =⇒ q ⊑
x
(1,n) s
q ⊑x(n,1) r ∧ r ⊑
x
(n,1) s =⇒ q ⊑
x
(n,1) s .
Proof. Directly from Lemma 10 and Lemma 11 below. ⊓⊔
Definition of the join of two strategies for (1, n) simulations. Let G0 = G(1,n)(q, r) and
G1 = G
(1,n)(r, s) be the basic simulation games between q and r, and between r and
s, respectively. Let σ0 and σ1 be two Duplicator’s strategies in G0 and G1, respectively.
We construct a joint strategy σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1 for Duplicator in the basic simulation game G =
G(1,n)(q, s). In the definition of the join, we assume that the automaton is complete,
hence it is always possible to select successors and the simulation game never halts.
G
〈U, 〉
1
1DU,L
0SU,R
1DE,R
DE,R
G
SU,R
1SU,R
SE,L 0SE,L
SU,R
1SU,R
G0
0DU,L
DU,L0DE,R
1SE,L
G
G
〈E, 〉
1
1DE,R
DE,R
We keep track of the current state of the G0 game and at most n games in G1. In the pic-
ture above, G0 is shown in the center, where games in G1 are shown at the top/bottom
of the picture, where, for X ∈ {E,U}, with G〈X, 〉1 we mean those games in G1 where
the (only) Left pebble is existential/universal. An arrow of the form · PX,Y
P ′
X,Y ′
· ,
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means that X-pebbles on side Y moved by player P in the source game induce a move
by playerP ′ in the destination game on side Y ′, whereP, P ′ ∈ {S,D, 0S, 0D, 1S, 1D},
X ∈ {E,U} and Y, Y ′ ∈ {L(eft), R(ight)}. (Notice that the kind of pebbles X does
not change across an arrow.)
The necessary bookkeeping is done by using a logbook. At round k ≥ 0, the cur-
rent logbook is a triple Lk = (L0k, L1k, wk), where wk = a0a1 . . . ak−1 is the in-
put word constructed so far (and we let w0 = ε if k = 0), L0k = π0k, with π0k =
〈q00 , r
0
0〉〈q
0
1 , r
0
1〉 . . . 〈q
0
k, r
0
k〉, is a partial play in G0 of length k+1, which is σ0-conform
to wk, and L1k = {π1k,0, π1k,1, . . . , π1k,l(k)} is a set of partial plays in G1, which are
σ1-conform to wk, of length k + 1, and of the form
π1k,i = 〈r
1
0,i, s
1
0,i〉〈r
1
1,i, s
1
1,i〉 · · · 〈r
1
k,i, s
1
k,i〉, for i ∈ 0, . . . , l(k) .
Assume that at round k ≥ 0 the current partial play in G is πk, where
πk = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 . . . 〈qk, sk〉 . (*)
We say that a logbook Lk is valid if it satisfies the logbook properties below.
q0k = qk (P0)
r0k =
l(k)⋃
i=0
{r1k,i} (P1)
sk =
l(k)⋃
i=0
s1k,i (P2)
Notice that (P1) entails the following property: (P1’) For every r ∈ r0k, there exists i s.t.
π1k,i = 〈r
1
0,i, s
1
0,i〉 · · · 〈r
1
k,i, s
1
k,i〉with r = r1k,i, i.e., r is the r.h.s. of the last configuration
of some partial play in L1k.
We inductively show how to build a valid logbook and we define the joint strategy
σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1. The initial configuration in G0 is 〈q, r〉, the one in G1 is 〈r, s〉, and the one
in G is 〈q, s〉. Hence, the initial logbook L0 := (L00, L10), with L00 = 〈q00 , r00〉 and
L10 = {〈r
1
0 , s
1
0〉}, is clearly valid, where q00 = q, r00 = r10 = r and s10 = s.
Inductively assume that, at round k, Lk is a valid logbook, and that the current
(partial) play in G is πk, with πk = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 · · · 〈qk, sk〉 (as in (*)). We show
how to build a new logbook Lk+1 = (L0k+1, L1k+1, wk+1) for the next round, and we
prove it valid. Assume that Spoiler moves as follows:
({qk}, sk, ak, (qk)
′, (sk)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
, (S)
i.e., the next input symbol is ak and Spoiler moves universal-r.h.s. pebbles from sk to
(sk)
′
. Notice that, if qk is existential, then Spoiler moves the only l.h.s. pebble from
qk := {qk} to (qk)′ := {(qk)′}, otherwise (qk)′ := ∅. Notice that we can already
update the next input word to wk+1 := wk · ak, which defines the third component of
the next logbook.
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For any universal state rUk,i ∈ r0k ∩ U , let π1k,i be the path in L1k s.t. π1k,i =
〈r10,i, s
1
0,i〉 · · · 〈r
1
k,i, s
1
k,i〉 with r1k,i = rUk,i, which is guaranteed to exist by property
(P1’). Spoiler’s move (S) above induces the G1-Spoiler’s move from 〈rUk,i, s1k,i〉 below:
({rUk,i}, s
1
k,i, ak, {}, (s
1
k,i)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G1
, (1-Si)
i.e., ak is fixed by move (S) above, and (s1k,i)′ is the subset of (sk)′ obtained by restrict-
ing Spoiler’s move (S) to s1k,i ⊆ sk, the containment following by property (P2). We
now apply G1-Duplicator’s strategy σ1, obtaining
σ1(〈r
1
0,i, s
1
0,i〉 · · · 〈r
U
k,i, s
1
k,i〉)(ak, r
U
k,i, (s
1
k,i)
′) = 〈(rUk,i)
′, (s1k,i)
′′〉 . (1-Di)
By the completeness condition, it is always possible to select some successor (rUk,i)′
and (s1k,i)′′ 6= ∅.
The move (1-Di) above fixes a successor (rUk,i)′ for each universal state rUk,i in r0k.
We now consider these moves as adversarial in G0, i.e., they induce a G0-Spoiler’s
move
({q0k}, r
0
k, ak, (q
0
k)
′, (r0k)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G0
, (0-S)
where (r0k)′ is the set of elements (rUk,i)′ above. We then apply G0-Duplicator’s strategy
σ0, obtaining
σ0(〈q
0
0 , r
0
0〉 · · · 〈q
0
k, r
0
k〉)(ak, (q
0
k)
′, (r0k)
′) = 〈q0k+1, r
0
k+1〉 . (0-D)
Notice that, if q0k is existential, then {q0k+1} = (q0k)′ as determined in (S), other-
wise q0k+1 is determined by (0-D) above. The new configuration of the game G0 is
〈q0k+1, r
0
k+1〉, and, accordingly, the first componentL0k+1 of the new logbook is defined
as L0k+1 := π
0
k · 〈q
0
k+1, r
0
k+1〉. By the completeness condition, it is always possible to
select some successor q0k+1 and r0k+1 6= ∅.
The G0-Duplicator’s move (0-D) above fixes a successor (rEk,i)′ for any existential
rEk,i ∈ r
0
k ∩ E By the logbook property (P1’), for any such rEk,i, there exists a path π1k,i
in L1k s.t. π1k,i = 〈r10,i, s10,i〉 · · · 〈rEk,i, s1k,i〉. The G0-Duplicator’s move (0-D) above is
interpreted adversarially in G1:
({rEk,i}, s
1
k,i, ak, (r
E
k,i)
′, (s1k,i)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G1
. (1-S′i)
We then apply G1-Duplicator’s winning strategy σ1:
σ1(〈r
1
0,i, s
1
0,i〉 · · · 〈r
E
k,i, s
1
k,i〉)(ak, (r
E
k,i)
′, (s1k,i)
′) = 〈(rEk,i)
′, (s1k,i)
′′〉 . (1-D′i)
Once again, the completeness condition entails that it is always possible to select some
successor (rEk,i)
′ and (s1k,i)′′ 6= ∅.
We are now ready to defineL1k+1. Let (r1k,i)′ be any state (rUk,i)′ defined in (1-Di), or
any state (rEk,i)′ defined in (1-D′i), which is not discarded in (0-D), i.e., (r1k,i)′ ∈ r0k+1.
(Notice that r0k+1 6= ∅ by the completeness property, as already noticed above. Hence,
there exists at least one such (r1k,i)′.) We then add π1k,i · 〈(r1k,i)′, (s1k,i)′′〉 to the second
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componentL1k+1 of the new logbook. It is easy to check that, by construction, property
(P1) holds at round k + 1.
Finally, we define Duplicator’s move in G as
({qk}, sk, ak, (qk)
′, (sk)
′, {qk+1}, sk+1) ∈ Γ
Dup
G
, (D)
where qk+1 := q0k+1 is fixed by move (0-D) if qk = q0k is existential, and it is fixed
by (S) if it is universal. (Notice that this establishes property (P0).) Moreover, sk+1 is
taken to be the union of all sets (s1k,i)′′ constructed in (1-Di) and (1-D′i) above, i.e.,
sk+1 :=
⋃
i(s
1
k,i)
′′
, which, in turn, establishes property (P2). Hence,
(σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1) (〈q0, s0〉 · · · 〈qk, sk〉) (ak, (qk)
′, (sk)
′) := 〈qk+1, sk+1〉 .
The following theorem shows that ⊑(1,n) is transitive, i.e., it shows that when σ0
and σ1 are both winning, then σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1 is winning as well.
Lemma 10. Let x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. Then,
q ⊑x(1,n) r ∧ r ⊑
x
(1,n) s =⇒ q ⊑
x
(1,n) s .
Proof. We refer to the logbook Lk at round k as defined above. We first deal with the
case in which the game G never ends prematurely.
For x = ∀di, we have to show that, whenever qk is accepting, so is every pebble
in sk. Assume qk ∈ F . Since σ0 is a winning strategy, then r0k ⊆ F . By the logbook
property (P1’), the current configuration of every game in G1 is of the form 〈r, s〉, for
some r ∈ F and s ⊆ Q. But σ1 is winning, hence every such s is contained in F . By
(P2), sk ⊆ F .
For x = de, assume that qk is accepting. Since σ0 is winning, there exists j ≥ k
s.t. good∃(r0j , k). Thus, for any r1j,i ∈ r0j , there exists j(i) s.t. r1j(i),i ∈ F . By (P1),
let 〈r1
j(i),i, sj(i),i〉 be the configuration at round j(i) of some G1-game. Since σ1 is
winning, there exists j(i)′ ≥ j(i) s.t. good∃(sj(i)′,i, j(i)). Let j∗ = maxi(j(i)′): Then,
for all i, every state in sj∗,i has seen an accepting state since round k. By (P2), sj∗ =⋃
i s
1
j∗,i. Thus, every state in sj∗ has seen an accepting state since round k. Therefore,
there exists a minimal k∗ s.t. k ≤ k∗ ≤ j∗ and good∃(sk∗ , k).
For x = f, the reasoning is entirely similar to the previous paragraph.
We now deal with the case in which the game G ends prematurely. If the Left pebble
on qk is stuck, then Duplicator wins, and we are done. Otherwise, assume that the Left
pebble is never stuck. We show that, in this case, the game actually never stops. In
fact, since σ0 is a winning strategy in G0, then there always exists some Right pebble
rk,i ∈ rk which can proceed. By (P1)’, there exists some configuration 〈rk,i, sk,i〉 in
G1 which can go on, and, being σ1 winning in such a game, then some pebble in sk,i
can be moved, and, therefore, some pebble in sk can be moved as well (by (P2)). Thus,
G never stops. ⊓⊔
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Definition of the join of two strategies for (n, 1) simulations. The definitions for (n, 1)
simulations are dual to the (1, n) case in the previous section. Let G0 = G(n,1)(q, r)
and G1 = G(n,1)(r, s) be two basic simulation games. Let σ0 and σ1 be two Duplica-
tor’s strategies in G0 and G1, respectively. We construct a joint strategy σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1 for
Duplicator in the basic simulation game G = G(n,1)(q, s).
G
〈 ,E〉
0
0DE,R
1SE,L
0DU,L
DU,L
G
SE,L
0SE,L
SU,R 1SU,R
SE,L
0SE,L
G1
1DE,R
DE,R1DU,L
0SU,R
G
G
〈 ,U〉
0
0DU,L
DU,L
We keep track of the current state of the G1 game and (at most) n games in G0 us-
ing the logbook technique. At round k ≥ 0, the current logbook is a triple Lk =
(L0k, L
1
k, wk), where wk = a0a1 . . . ak−1 is the input word constructed so far, L1k =
π1k = 〈r0, s
1
0〉〈r1, s
1
1〉 . . . 〈rk, s
1
k〉 is a partial σ1-conform to wk play of length k + 1
in G1, and L0k = {π0k,0, π0k,1, . . . , π0k,l(0)} is a set of partial σ0-conform (w.r.t. wk)
plays of length k + 1 in G0, with π0k,i = 〈q00,i, r00,i〉〈q01,i, r01,i〉 · · · 〈q0k,i, r0k,i〉, for
i ∈ {0, . . . , l(k)}. Every logbook Lk will satisfy an invariant, which consists of the
logbook properties (P0)–(P2) specified below. Assume that at round k ≥ 0 the current
play in G is πk, where πk = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 . . . 〈qk, sk〉. Then, Lk is a valid logbook
if
qk =
l(k)⋃
i=0
q0k,i (P0)
rk =
l(k)⋃
i=0
{r0k,i} (P1)
sk = s
1
k (P2)
We inductively show how to build a valid logbook and how to define the joint strat-
egy σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1. The initial configuration in G0 is 〈{q}, {r}〉 (there is only one such game
initially), the one in G1 is 〈{r}, {s}〉, and the one in G is 〈{q}, {s}〉. Let q0 = {q},
r0 = r, r0 = {r}, and s0 = s. Hence, the initial logbook L0 := (L00, L10, w0), with
L00 = {〈{q0}, {r0}〉}, L
1
0 = 〈{r0}, {s0}〉, and w0 = ε, is clearly valid.
Inductively assume that, at round k, the current partial play in G is πk, and that
Lk = (L
0
k, L
1
k, wk) is a valid logbook, where L0k, L1k and wk are defined as above. By
(P2),
πk = 〈q0, s0〉〈q1, s1〉 . . . 〈qk, sk〉
π0k,i = 〈q
0
k,0, r
0
0,i〉〈q
0
k,1, r
0
1,i〉 · · · 〈q
0
k,i, r
0
k,i〉, for i ∈ {0, . . . , l(k)}
π1k = 〈r0, s0〉〈r1, s1〉 . . . 〈rk, sk〉
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We show how to build a new, valid logbook Lk+1 = (L0k+1, L1k+1, wk+1) for the next
round. Assume that G-Spoiler moves as follows:
(qk, {sk}, ak, (qk)
′, (sk)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
, (S)
i.e., the next input symbol is ak and Spoiler moves existential-Left pebbles from qk to
(qk)
′
. We take wk+1 = wk · ak. Notice that, if sk is existential, then Spoiler moves the
only Right pebble from sk := {sk} to (sk)′ := {(sk)′}, otherwise (sk)′ := ∅.
For any existential state rE ∈ rEk , let π0k,i be the path in L0k ending in 〈q0k,i, rE〉
(i.e., r0k,i = rE), which is guaranteed to exist by property (P1). Spoiler’s move (S)
above induces the G0-Spoiler’s move below
(q0k,i, {r
E}, ak, (q
0
k,i)
′, {}) ∈ Γ Sp
G0
, (0-Si)
which is obtained by restricting to q0k,i ⊆ qk the transiton from qk to (qk)′, the inclu-
sion following from (P0). We apply G0-Duplicator’s strategy σ0, obtaining
σ0(〈q
0
0,i, r
0
0,i〉a0 · · ·ak−1〈q
0
k,i, r
E〉)(ak, (q
0
k,i)
′, {}) = (q0k+1,i, r
0
k+1,i) . (0-Di)
The move (0-Di) above fixes a successor r0k+1,i for each existential state rE in rEk
(in G0). We now consider these moves as adversarial in G1, i.e., they induce a G1-
Spoiler’s move
(rk, {sk}, ak, (rk)
′, (sk)
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G1
, (1-S)
where (rk)′ is the set of elements r0k+1,i defined above. We then apply G1-Duplicator’s
strategy σ1, obtaining
σ1(〈r0, s0〉a0 · · ·ak−1〈rk, sk〉)(ak, (rk)
′, (sk)
′) = (rk+1, {s
1
k+1}) . (1-D)
Notice that, if sk is universal, then s1k+1 = (sk)′, as determined in (S), otherwise s1k+1
is determined by (1-D) above. The second component L1k+1 of the new logbook is
L1k+1 = π
1
k · 〈rk+1, s
1
k+1〉.
Call a state r ∈ rk useful iff it has not been discarded by move (1-D), i.e., iff it
has some successor in rk+1. By the logbook property (P1), for each useful universal
state rU ∈ rUk , there exists a play π0k,i ∈ L0k s.t. π0k,i = 〈q00,i, r00,i〉 · · · 〈q0k,i, rU 〉 with
r0k,i = r
U
. The G1-Duplicator’s move (1-D) is then interpreted adversarially in G0:
(q0k,i, {r
U}, ak, (q
0
k,i)
′, {r0k+1,i}) ∈ Γ
Sp
G0
, (0-S′i)
and we apply G0-Duplicator’s winning strategy σ0, yielding
σ0(〈q
0
0,i, r
0
0,i〉a0 · · ·ak−1〈q
0
k,i, r
U 〉)(ak, (q
0
k,i)
′, r0k+1,i) = (q
0
k+1,i, r
0
k+1,i) . (0-D′i)
We now update the first component L0k of the logbook. For any useful existential or
universal state r0k,i ∈ rk with corresponding play π0k,i ∈ L0k (as above), let r0k+1,i be
as determined in (0-Di) or (0-S′i), respectively. Then, we add π0k,i · 〈q0k+1,i, r0k+1,i〉 to
L0k+1. Since every element in rk+1 arises as a successor of some useful element in rk,
we have that (P1) holds at round k + 1.
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Finally, we define Duplicator’s move in G as
(σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1) (〈q0, s0〉a0 · · · ak−1〈qk, sk〉) (ak, (qk)
′, (sk)
′) := (qk+1, sk+1) . (D)
where qk+1 is as union over all sets q0k+1,i defined by equations (0-Di) and (0-D′i),
and sk+1 := s1k+1 is defined according to (S) or (1-D), depending on whether sk was
universal or existential, respectively. Notice that, by definition of qk+1 and sk+1, prop-
erties (P0) and (P2) hold for the new logbook. This completes the description of the
joint strategy σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1.
The following theorem shows that ⊑x(n,1) is transitive, i.e., it shows that when σ0
and σ1 are both winning, then σ0 ⊲⊳ σ1 is winning as well.
Lemma 11. Let x ∈ {∀di, de, f}. Then,
q ⊑x(n,1) r ∧ r ⊑
x
(n,1) s =⇒ q ⊑
x
(n,1) s .
Proof. We refer to the logbook Lk at round k as defined above. For x = ∀di, we have
to show that, whenever some pebble in qk is accepting, so is sk. Assume qk ∩ F 6= ∅.
Then, there exists qF ∈ qk ∩ F and, by (P0), there exists q0k,i ⊆ qk s.t. qF ∈ q0k,i
and 〈q0k,i, r0k,i〉 is the current configuration in some G0 game. Since q0k,i ∩ F 6= ∅
and σ0 is a winning strategy, then r0k,i ∈ F . Hence, by the logbook property (P1),
rk =
⋃
i{r
0
k,i} ∩ F 6= ∅, where 〈rk, sk〉 is the current configuration in G1. Since
rk ∩ F 6= ∅ and σ1 is winning, we have sk ∈ F .
For x = de, assume that at round k every pebble in qk is universally good since
some previous round, i.e., good∀(qk) holds. Let 〈q0k,i, r0k,i〉 be any configuration in
G0. By (P0), q0k,i ⊆ qk, thus good∀(q0k,i). Since σ0 is winning, then, for every i, there
exists k(i) s.t. good∃({r0
k(i),i}, k), i.e., k(i) is the least index k′ s.t. r0k′,i ∈ F . Let i∗
be the index for which r0
k(i∗),i∗ ∈ F is the last pebble being accepting for the first time
since round k, i.e., i∗ = argmax
i
(k(i)). Hence, at round k(i∗) ≥ k, every pebble in
rk(i∗) has been universally good since round k. Since σ1 is winning, then there exists
k′ ≥ k(i∗) ≥ k s.t. sk′ ∈ F . Let k∗ ≤ k′ be the minimal k′′ ∈ [k, . . . , k′] s.t. sk′′ ∈ F .
Therefore, good∃({sk∗}, k), i.e., {sk∗} is existentially good since round k.
For x = f, assume that qk is universally good since some previous round for in-
finitely many k’s. By reasoning as above for delayed simulation, since σ0 is winning,
then rk is universally good since some previous round for infinitely many k’s. Finally,
being σ1 winning, we conclude that sk ∈ F for infinitely many k’s. ⊓⊔
D Section 5
D.1 Finite words
Lemma 5. LetQ be any alternating finite automaton, and let be any preorder which
implies finite-language inclusion. Then, Lfin(q) = Lfin([q]).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the length of w ∈ Σ∗. Let q any state in Q, and let
[q] be its equivalence class. Notice that, Lfin(q) = Lfin(q′) for any q′ ∈ [q].
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Assume w = ε. If w ∈ Lfin(q) then q ∈ F , hence [q] ∈ F ′ and w ∈ Lfin([q]) as
well. Conversely, if w ∈ Lfin([q]) then [q] ∈ F ′, hence there exists qF ∈ [q] ∩ F . But
Lfin(qF ) = Lfin(q), hence w ∈ Lfin(q).
Assume w = a0 . . . ak−1 is a word of length k, and let w′ = a1 . . . ak−1. We
proceed by case analysis on the type of [q].
– Case 1: [q] ∈ E′. We prove Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin([q]), distinguishing two subcases.
Subcase 1.1: q ∈ E. Assume w ∈ Lfin(q). Then, there exists (q, a0, q′) ∈ ∆ s.t.
w′ ∈ Lfin(q′), and, w.l.o.g., we may assume that q′ is an a0-maximal successor
of q. (If not, then there exists a state q′′  q′ which actually is an a0-maximal
successor of q, thus w′ ∈ Lfin(q′′) and then one can proceed from q′′.) By induc-
tion hypothesis, w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]). Hence, by the definition of quotient, there exists
([q], a0, [q
′]) ∈ ∆m≈, thus w ∈ Lfin([q]).
Subcase 1.2: q ∈ U . Let qE ∈ [q] ∩ E and, by definition of quotient, Lfin(q) =
Lfin(qE), and then one can proceed as above from qE . Thus, Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin([q]).
We now prove Lfin([q]) ⊆ Lfin(q). If w ∈ Lfin([q]), then ([q], a0, [q′]) ∈ ∆m≈ s.t.
w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]). By the definition of quotient, there exist q̂E ∈ [q] and q̂′ ∈ [q′]
s.t. (q̂E , a0, q̂′) ∈ ∆. By induction hypothesis, w′ ∈ Lfin(q̂′) (we do not use the
maximality of q̂′ here), hence w ∈ Lfin(q̂E) = Lfin(q).
– Case 2: [q] ∈ U ′. We prove Lfin(q) ⊆ Lfin([q]). Assume w ∈ Lfin(q). Let [q′] be
any element in [Q] s.t. ([q], a0, [q′]) ∈ ∆m≈. We have to show that w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]).
By the definition of quotient, there exist q̂ ∈ [q] and q̂′ ∈ [q′] (we do not use the
minimality of q̂′ here) s.t. (q̂, a0, q̂′) ∈ ∆. We have that Lfin(q) = Lfin(q̂), hence
w ∈ Lfin(q̂). Since q̂ ∈ U , then every a0-successor of q̂ accepts w′. In particular,
w′ ∈ Lfin(q̂′), and, by induction hypothesis, w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]), But [q′] was arbitrary,
thus w ∈ Lfin([q]).
We prove Lfin([q]) ⊆ Lfin(q). Assume w ∈ Lfin([q]). Let q′ be any element in Q
s.t. (q, a0, q′) ∈ ∆, and we have to show w′ ∈ Lfin(q′) for any such q′. In partic-
ular, it is sufficient to show w′ ∈ Lfin(q′) for any a0-minimal q′, since Lfin(q′) ⊆
Lfin(q′′) for any q′′  q′. Hence, we assume that q′ is an a0-minimal successor of
q. Being [q] ∈ U ′, we have that w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]) for any a0-successor [q′] of [q]. As
(q, a0, q
′) ∈ ∆ and by the definition of quotient, there exists ([q], a0, [q′]) ∈ ∆m≈.
Thus, w′ ∈ Lfin([q′]), and, by induction hypothesis, w′ ∈ Lfin(q′). But q′ was ar-
bitrary, thus w ∈ Lfin(q). ⊓⊔
D.2 Infinite words: Direct simulation
The two directions in Theorem 8 are proved, resp., by Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 below.
Lemma 12. If q ⊑∀di(1,n) s, then [q]m+ ⊑∀di(1,n) s, where the quotient is taken w.r.t.⊑∀di(1,k).
Proof. Let G = G∀di(1,n)([q], s) and, at round i, if the current configuration of G is
〈[qi], si〉, let Gi = G∀di(1,n)(qi, si). We maintain the following invariant: At round i,
qi ⊑∀di(1,n) si. Notice that the invariant implies the lemma: The crucial observation is
that [qi] ∈ F ′ implies [qi] ⊆ F , i.e., if one state in the quotient is acceping, then, by
the definition of direct simulation, all states in the quotient are accepting as well, and,
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in particular, qi ∈ F . By the invariant and by the definition of ∀di-simulation, qi ∈ F
implies si ⊆ F .
Assume the current configuration in G is 〈[qi], si〉, and qi ⊑∀di(1,n) si. Let Spoiler
choose the next input symbol ai. We consider two cases, depending on whether [qi] is
existential or universal.
First case: [qi] ∈ E′. Let Spoiler choose an ai-successor [qi+1] of [qi], i.e., Spoiler
chooses transition
({[qi]}, si, ai, {[qi+1]}, s
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
.
By the definition of minimax quotient, there exist q̂ ∈ [qi] ∩ E and q′ ∈ [qi+1]
s.t. q′ ∈ ∆(q̂, a). (Note that we do not use the maximality of q′ in this proof.) We
have q̂ ⊑∀di(1,k) qi ⊑
∀di
(1,n) si. But (1, k)-simulation implies (1, n)-simulation (The-
orem 1), therefore q̂ ⊑∀di(1,n) qi, and, by transitivity, q̂ ⊑∀di(1,n) si. We let G(q̂, si)-
Spoiler choose transition ({q̂}, si, ai, {q′}, s′) ∈ Γ SpG(bq,si), and then we apply G(q̂, si)-
Duplicator’s winning strategy, obtaining transition ({q̂}, si, ai, {q′}, s′, {q′}, si+1) ∈
Γ
Dup
G(bq,si)
. Clearly, q′ ∈ [qi+1], q′ ⊑∀di(1,n) si+1, and the invariant is preserved.
We define G-Duplicator’s response as
({[qi]}, si, ai, {[qi+1]}, s
′, {[qi+1]}, si+1) ∈ Γ
Dup
G
.
Second case: [qi] ∈ U ′. By the definition of quotient, qi ∈ U . Let Spoiler choose
transition
({[qi]}, si, ai, {}, s
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
.
We let Gi-Spoiler choose transition ({qi}, si, ai, {}, s′) ∈ Γ SpGi , and then we apply
Gi-Duplicator’s winning strategy, obtaining ({qi}, si, ai, {}, s′, {qi+1}, si+1) ∈ ΓDupGi .
The crucial point is that we can assume w.l.o.g. that qi+1 is a n-∀di-minimal ai-successor
of qi. In particular, it is also k-∀di-minimal. This implies that there exists a ai-transition
in the quotient automaton from [qi] to [qi+1]. Thus, G-Duplicator’s response is defined
as
({[qi]}, si, ai, {}, s
′, {[qi+1]}, si+1) ∈ Γ
Dup
G
.
Clearly, qi+1 ⊑∀di(1,n) si+1, and the invariant is preserved also in this case. ⊓⊔
Lemma 13. If q ⊑∀di(1,n) s, then q ⊑∀di(1,n) [s]m+, where the quotient is taken w.r.t.⊑∀di(1,k).
Proof. Let G = G(q, [s]) and, at round i, if the current configuration of G is 〈qi, [si]〉,
let Gi = G(qi, si). We maintain the following invariant: qi ⊑∀di(1,n) si. The invariant
implies the lemma: if qi ∈ F , then, by the definition of ∀di-simulation, si ⊆ F , thence,
by the definition of quotient, [si] ⊆ F ′.
Assume the current configuration in G is 〈qi, [si]〉, and qi ⊑∀di(1,n) si. Let Spoiler
choose the next input symbol ai and a transition
({qi}, [si], ai,q
′, [s′]) ∈ Γ Sp
G
,
where [s′] is obtained by fixing a successor [s′] for any [sU ] ∈ [si]∩U ′. (Notice that, if
qi ∈ E, then q′ = {qi+1} is just a singleton, for some qi+1 ∈ ∆(qi, a), otherwise, when
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qi ∈ U , we have that q′ = {} as Left universal pebbles are under Duplicator’s control.)
By the definition of minimax quotient, ([sU ], ai, [s′]) ∈ ∆m+ implies that there exist
ŝU ∈ [sU ] and ŝ′ ∈ [s′] s.t. ŝ′ ∈ ∆(ŝU , ai). (*) Let s′ be the set of states ŝ′ obtained
above. (We do not use the minimality of ŝ′ in this proof.) For any mixed class [sUmix] ∈
[si], for which its representative sUmix ∈ si is universal, let sEmix ∈ [sUmix]∩E be a (1, k)-
∀di-equivalent existential representative, for which, in particular, sUmix ⊑∀di(1,k) s
E
mix. Let
pi be equal to si, but where each sUmix is replaced by sEmix. By the invariant, qi ⊑∀di(1,n) si
and, by the definition of pi and by transitivity, qi ⊑∀di(1,n) pi. The game then proceeds
by using pi in place of si. Notice that universal states in pi are exactly those universal
states in si which belong to a purely universal quotient. We let G(qi,pi)-Spoiler choose
transition ({qi},pi, ai,q′, s′) ∈ Γ SpG(qi,pi), where s
′ is obtained from pi ∩ U ⊆ si ∩ U
by fixing successors as prescribed in (*) above. We then apply G(qi,pi)-Duplicator’s
winning strategy, yielding transition ({qi},pi, ai,q′, s′, {qi+1},pi+1) ∈ ΓDupG(qi,pi). It
might be the case that some transition (pE , ai, p′) ∈ ∆ induced above, for pE ∈ pi∩E
and p′ ∈ pi+1, (if any) does not induce a transition in the quotient, i.e., there exists
no corresponding transition ([pE ], ai, [p′]) ∈ ∆m+. This happens when, in definition of
minimax+ quotient, p′ is not selected as a k-maximal representative for ai-successors
of pE . If this is the case, then, by the definition of minimax+ quotient, there exists some
k-maximal ai-successor s′′ ⊆ maxk ,∀diai (p
E) s.t. p′ ⊑∀di(1,k) s
′′ and, for all s′′ ∈ s′′,
([pE ], ai, [s
′′]) ∈ ∆m+. We define si+1 as pi+1, where elements p′ are replaced by s′′,
as specified above. Then, G-Duplicator’s response is defined as
({qi}, [si], ai,q
′, [s′], {qi+1}, [si+1]) ∈ Γ
Dup
G
.
Since qi+1 ⊑∀di(1,n) pi+1, and, by the definition of si+1 and transitivity, qi+1 ⊑∀di(1,n) si+1,
the invariant is preserved. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. q ≈∀di(1,n) [q]m+, where the quotient is taken w.r.t. ⊑∀di(1,k). In particular,
Lω(q) = Lω([q]m+).
Proof. Since q ⊑∀di(1,n) {q} trivially holds, the theorem follows from previous Lemma 12
and 13. ⊓⊔
D.3 Infinite words: Delayed simulation
Lemma 14. Let q, s ∈ U . If q ≈x(1,n) s, then, for any q′ ∈ minn,xa (q), there exists
s′ ∈ minn,xa (s) s.t. q
′ ≈x(1,n) s
′
.
Proof. We actually prove the following richer statement.
Claim. Let q, s ∈ U s.t. q ≈x(1,n) s. Then, for any q′ ∈ min
n,x
a (q), 1) there exists
s′ ∈ ∆(s, a) s.t. s′ ⊑x(1,n) q
′
, and, for any s′′ ∈ ∆(s, a), s′′ ⊑x(1,n) q′ implies both 2.1)
s′′ ∈ minn,xa (s), and 2.2) q′ ≈x(1,n) s′′.
Let q ≈x(1,n) s, and let q′ ∈ min
n,x
a (q). Point 1) follows from the definition of simula-
tion, i.e., there exists s′ ∈ ∆(s, a) s.t. s′ ⊑x(1,n) q
′
.
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We now show Points 2.1) and 2.2), i.e., we show that any such s′ is in fact an x-
minimal a-successor of s. Let s′′ ∈ ∆(s, a) be any other a-successor of s s.t. s′′ ⊑x(1,n)
s′. We have to show s′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′′ as well. Since q ⊑x(1,n) s, from the definition of
simulation, there exists q′′ ∈ ∆(q, a) s.t. q′′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′′
. Hence, we have the following
chain of inclusions: q′′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′ ⊑x(1,n) q
′
. By the transitivity of ⊑x(1,n)
established in Theorem 6, we have q′′ ⊑x(1,n) q′, and, by the minimality of q′, q′ ⊑x(1,n)
q′′. By transitivity, all states in {q′′, s′′, s′, q′} are x-simulation equivalent. In particular,
s′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′′
, which establishes Point 2.1), and q′ ⊑x(1,n) s′, which establishes Point
2.2). ⊓⊔
Lemma 15. Let s ∈ U and q ∈ E. If q ≈x(1,n) s, then there exists q′ ⊆ ∆(q, a) s.t., for
any s′ ∈ minn,xa (s), s′ ⊑x(1,n) q
′
.
Proof. Let s ∈ U , q ∈ E, and q ≈x(1,n) s. From s ⊑x(1,n) q and by the definition of
simulation, there exists q′ ⊆ ∆(q, a) and s′′ ∈ ∆(s, a) s.t. s′′ ⊑x(1,n) q′.
Let s′ be any element in minn,xa (s). From q ⊑x(1,n) s and by the definition of simu-
lation, it follows that, for any q′ ∈ q′, we have q′ ⊑x(1,n) s
′
. Since s′′ ⊑x(1,n) q′, and any
element in q′ is simulated by s′, we obtain, by transitivity (Theorem 6), s′′ ⊑x(1,n) s′,
and, by the minimality of s′, s′ ⊑x(1,n) s′′ ⊑x(1,n) q′. By transitivity, s′ ⊑x(1,n) q′. ⊓⊔
Lemma 16. If q⊑de(1,n)s, then [q]se+⊑de(1,n)s, where the quotient is taken w.r.t. ⊑de(1,n).
Proof. In the following, we simply write ⊑ instead of ⊑de(1,n). Then, when we write
q ⊑σ s, we mean that σ is Duplicator’s winning strategy in G(q, s), i.e., the one wit-
nessing q ⊑ s. In the proof, we need the following definitions: For any Duplicator’s
strategy σ : PP1 7→ (P0 7→ P1) and for any π ∈ P , we define a new Duplicator’s
strategy σπ in the following way: For any π′ ∈ PP1, σπ(π′) := σ(π · π′). Given any
Duplicator’s strategy σ, we say that a sequence π1 = sksk+1 . . . is σ-right-conform
starting at pk iff there exist sequences π0 = pkpk+1 . . . and w = akak+1 . . . s.t.
π = 〈pk, sk〉〈pk+1, sk+1〉 . . . is σ-conform w.r.t. w. We will use the following fact:
Claim. Assume π1 = sksk+1 . . . is σ-right-conform starting at pk. If pk ∈ F and σ is
a winning strategy, then there exists i ≥ k s.t. good∃(si, k).
We are now ready for proving the lemma. Let G = G([q], s) and, at round k, if
the current configuration of G is 〈[qk], sk〉, let Gk = G(qk, sk). We build a sequence
of winning strategies σ0, σ1, . . . , s.t., at round k, σk is a winning strategy in Gk, i.e.,
qk ⊑σk sk. Then, we define a strategy σ for Duplicator in G, which, at round k, is
defined in terms of σk. Finally, we prove that σ is winning.
Assume the current configuration in G is 〈[qk], sk〉, and that σk is a winning strategy
in Gk s.t. qk ⊑σk sk. Let Spoiler choose the next input symbol ak. We consider two
cases, depending on whether [qk] is existential or universal.
First case: [qk] ∈ E′. Let Spoiler choose an ak-successor [qk+1] of [qk], i.e., Spoiler
chooses transition
({[qk]}, sk, ak, {[qk+1]}, s
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
.
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By the definition of semielective quotient, there exist q̂ ∈ [qk] and q′ ∈ [qk+1] s.t.
q′ ∈ ∆(q̂, a). If [qk] ∩ F 6= ∅, then let qF be any accepting state in [qk], otherwise let
qF be just q̂. We distinguish two subcases, depending on whether q̂ is in E or in U .
– First subcase: q̂ ∈ E. We have that
q̂ ⊑bσ q
F ⊑σF qk ⊑σk sk .
We let G(q̂, sk)-Spoiler choose transition ({q̂}, sk, ak, {q′}, s′) ∈ Γ SpG(bq,sk). Let
σ¯ = σ̂ ⊲⊳ σF ⊲⊳ σk, and let sk+1 be the result of G(q̂, sk)-Duplicator playing
according to σ¯, i.e., σ¯({q̂}, sk)(ak, {q′}, s′) = ({q′}, sk+1). Clearly, q′ ⊑σ¯pi sk+1,
with π = 〈q̂, sk〉. But q′ ∈ [qk+1], thus qk+1 ⊑σ′ q′ ⊑σ¯pi sk+1 for some σ′. By
transitivity, qk+1 ⊑σ′⊲⊳σ¯pi sk+1. We let σk+1 := σ′ ⊲⊳ σ¯π.
– Second subcase: q̂ ∈ U . By the definition of semielective quotient, q′ ∈ minn,dea (q̂).
(Notice that, although q̂ is a universal state in this case, it is still Spoiler who has to
choose a successor q′ of q̂, since [qk] is an existential state in the quotient automa-
ton). Since [qk] is a mixed class, there exists qE ∈ [qi] ∩ E s.t.
q̂ ⊑bσ q
E ⊑σE q
F ⊑σF qk ⊑σk sk .
Since q̂ ⊑ qE , by the minimality of q′ and Point 2) of Lemma 15, there exists q′ ⊆
∆(qE , a) s.t. q′ ⊑ q′. Hence, w.l.o.g. σ̂ can be taken s.t. σ̂({q̂}, {qE})(ak, {}, {}) =
({q′},q′), where q′ is fixed by G([q], s)-Spoiler, and not under the control of
G(q̂, qE)-Duplicator.
Let σ¯ := σ̂ ⊲⊳ σE ⊲⊳ σF ⊲⊳ σk. Similarly to the previous point, G(q̂, sk)-Spoiler
chooses a transition ({q̂}, sk, ak, {}, s′) ∈ Γ Sp. We let G(q̂, sk)-Duplicator answer
with σ¯({q̂}, sk)(ak, {}, s′) = ({q′}, sk+1), where q′ is the a ak-successor fixed by
G([q], s)-Spoiler above. As before, qk+1 ⊑σ′ q′ ⊑σ¯pi sk+1, where π = 〈q̂, sk〉.
Hence, by transitivity, qk+1 ⊑σ′⊲⊳σ¯ sk+1. We let σk+1 := σ′ ⊲⊳ σ¯π.
In both cases, qk+1 ⊑σk+1 sk+1. We define G-Duplicator’s winning strategy σ as
σ(πk〈{[qk]}, sk〉)(ak, {[qk+1]}, s
′) = ({[qk+1]}, sk+1) .
Second case: [qk] ∈ U ′. By the definition of quotient, qk ∈ U . Let Spoiler choose
transition
({[qk]}, sk, ak, {}, s
′) ∈ Γ Sp
G
.
If [qk] ∩ F 6= ∅, let qF ∈ U be any accepting state in [qk], otherwise let qF be just qk.
Then, we have
qF ⊑σF qk ⊑σk sk .
Let σ¯ = σF ⊲⊳ σk. Let G(qF , sk)-Spoiler choose transition ({qF }, sk, ak, {}, s′) ∈
Γ
Sp
G(qF ,sk)
, and let G(qF , sk)-Duplicator choose transition ({qF }, sk, ak, {}, s′, {qk+1}, sk+1) ∈
Γ
Dup
G(qF ,sk)
according to σ¯. We let σk+1 := σ¯π, with π = 〈{qF }, sk〉. The crucial point is
that we can assume w.l.o.g. that qk+1 is a de-minimal ak-successor of qF . This implies
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that there exists a ak-transition in the quotient automaton from [qk] to [qk+1]. Thus,
G-Duplicator’s response is defined as
σ(πk〈{[qk]}, sk〉)(ak, {}, s
′) = ({[qk+1]}, sk+1) .
This concludes the description of the second case.
We now argue about the correctness of the construction above, showing that Du-
plicator’s strategy is winning in G. If the Left pebble in G gets stuck, then Duplicator
wins, and we are done. Otherwise, assume the Left pebble never gets stuck. By construc-
tion, since we are taking joins of winning strategies, it follows that some Right pebble
can always be moved, and the game does not halt prematurely. Thus, an infinite path
π = 〈[q0], s0〉〈[q1], s1〉 . . . results, where q0 = q and s0 = s. Assume [qk] ∈ F ′, for
some k. There exists qF ∈ [qk] s.t. qF ∈ F and, in any of the cases above, there exists
a winning strategy σF s.t. qF ⊑σF qk ⊑σk sk. Let σ˜ := σF ⊲⊳ σk be a winning strat-
egy in G(qF , sk). By construction, the sequence π1 = sksk+1 . . . is σ˜-right-conform
starting at qF . By the above claim, there exists i ≥ k s.t. good∃(si, k). ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. [q]se+⊑de(1,n)q.
The lemma below implies q ⊑de(1,1) [q]se+. Notice that we actually prove the much
stronger claim that [q]se+ di-simulates q.
Lemma 17. For any q ∈ Q, q ⊑di(1,1) [q]se+.
Proof. We maintain the following invariant: If (sk, [qk]) is the current configuration in
G
di
(1,1)(q, [q]), then sk ∈ [qk]. Clearly, the invariant implies that the winning condition
for direct simulation is satisfied: If sk ∈ F , then [qk] ∈ F ′.
The initial configuration is (s0, [q0]) with s0 = q, and [q0] = [q], and the invariant
clearly holds since s0 ∈ [q0].
Inductively, assume the current configuration is (sk, [qk]) and the invariant sk ∈ [qk]
holds. We distinguish three different cases.
– Case 1: sk ∈ E. Then [qk] ∈ E′. Assume Spoiler chooses transition
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {sk+1}, {}) ∈ Γ
Sp .
From (sk, ak, sk+1) ∈ ∆, the invariant sk ∈ [qk] and by the definition of semielec-
tive quotient, there exists a transition ([qk], ak, [sk+1]) ∈ ∆se+≈ . Thus, Duplicator
can select transition
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {sk+1}, {}, {sk+1}, {[sk+1]}) ∈ Γ
Dup .
Clearly sk+1 ∈ [sk+1], and the invariant is preserved.
– Case 2: sk ∈ U and [qk] ∈ E′. In this case, Spoiler only chooses ak:
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {}, {}) ∈ Γ
Sp .
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If sk has no ak-successor, then Duplicator wins. Otherwise, let sk+1 ∈ minn,deak (sk)
be a de-minimal ak-successor of sk. By the definition of semielective quotient and
by the minimality of sk+1, there exists a transition ([qk], ak, [sk+1]) ∈ ∆se+≈ , thus
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {}, {}, {sk+1}, {[sk+1]}) ∈ Γ
Dup .
Clearly sk+1 ∈ [sk+1], and the invariant is preserved.
– Case 3: sk ∈ U and [qk] ∈ U ′. In this case, we use the minimality of successors of
universal states in universal classes. Assume Spoiler chooses transition
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {}, {[qk+1]}) ∈ Γ
Sp .
From the definition of quotient, there exists a transition (qk, ak, qk+1) ∈ ∆ s.t.
qk+1 ∈ min
n,de
ak
(qk). From the invariant sk ∈ [qk], we have sk ≈de(1,n) qk. By
Lemma 14, there exists sk+1 ∈ minn,deak (sk) s.t. sk+1 ≈
de
(1,n) qk+1. Therefore,
Duplicator can select transition
({sk}, {[qk]}, ak, {}, {[qk+1]}, {sk+1}, {[qk+1]}) ∈ Γ
Dup
s.t. sk+1 ∈ [qk+1], thus preserving the invariant. ⊓⊔
Remark 9. Lemma 17 above is even true when quotienting w.r.t. fair simulation, or even
ordinary simulation. Notice that requiring minimal transitions from universal states in
mixed semielective-classes not only is required for correctness (see Section 5.2), but it
also makes the proof much easier.
Theorem 9. q ≈de(1,n) [q]se+, where the quotient is taken w.r.t. ⊑de(1,n). In particular,
Lω(q) = Lω([q]se+).
Proof. Directly from Corollary 1 and Lemma 17, and from the fact that simulation
implies language inclusion (Theorem 4). ⊓⊔
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Q Q≈
Fig. 5. An example showing that (minimal) transitions from universal states in mixed classes are
needed in semielective quotients. The only two (1, n)-simulation equivalent states in Q are qU
and qE . (In fact, n = 2 suffices.) The resulting mixed class in Q≈ is [ ] = {qU , qE}. The dashed
a-transition on the right (due to qU ) is needed and cannot be discarded: Indeed, Lω(Q) 6= ∅,
while removing the dashed transition from Q≈ would make Lω(Q≈) = ∅.
p0 p1 p2 p3 · · · pk
a a a a a
a
a0
a1 a2 a3 ak
A
A
A A
A
A
A
A
A
Ab
c
b, c
A = {a0, a1, . . . , ak}, Σ = A ∪ {a, b, c}
Fig. 6. An example showing that multipebble-semielective quotients can achieve arbitrarily high
compression ratios. The NBA above has k + 4 states, and the pi’s are (1, 1)-delayed simula-
tion incomparable: Thus, the (1, 1)-semielective quotient has k + 4 states. However, the pi’s are
all (1, n)-delayed simulation equivalent (and n = 2 suffices), therefore the (1, n)-semielective
quotient has only 4 states. Moreover, the pi’s are incomparable also w.r.t. (1, n)-universal direct
simulation, which shows that semielective quotients can achieve arbitrarily high compression ra-
tios relative to minimax quotients. Finally, notice that direct backward simulation does not help
either: In fact, any two pi, pj , with i 6= j, are backward-simulation incomparable, as there is
just one way of backward reaching the unique initial state p0. (Remember that backward simula-
tions should be compatible with the initial states, at least.) Therefore, quotienting methods which
employ backward simulations, like mediated preorder [1], do not result in a smaller automaton.
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E Section 6
We give upper-bounds on the size of game-graphs necessary for computing multipebble
simulations. When considering the size of the those game-graphs, we will make use of
the following counting function:
subn(k) =
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
,
which counts the number of subsets of size ≤ k of a given set of size n, and we will
approximate its value from above by using the following rough upper bound
subn(k) ≤ (n+ 1)
k .
Intuitively, the bound above may be seen as follows: Instead of counting sets of size
≤ k, one counts ordered sets; each ordered set can be represented as a k-string over
an alphabet of size n+ 1, where we use an extra end-of-string symbol. We also give a
formal calculation.
k∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
=
k∑
i=0
(n
i
)(n− 1
i− 1
)
. . .
(
n− i+ 1
1
)
≤
k∑
i=0
(n
i
)( n
i− 1
)
. . .
(n
1
)
≤
k∑
i=0
ni ·
(
k
i
)(
k − 1
i− 1
)
. . .
(
k − i+ 1
1
)
=
k∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
· ni = (n+ 1)k .
E.1 Solving existential and universal direct simulation
For computing the winner for direct simulation, we construct a 2-player game Gdi =
〈V diE , V
di
A ,→
di〉, where Eve has a safety objective. The game-graph is the same for
both existential and universal direct simulation, but the safety objective is different.
Nodes in V diA take the form v(q,s), while nodes in V diE take the form v(q,s,a,q′,s′), with
q,q′ ∈ 2Q,k1 and s, s′ ∈ 2Q,k2 , and a ∈ Σ.
Lemma 18.
∣∣V di∣∣ ≤ 2 · (n+ 1)2(k1+k2) · |Σ|.
Proof. ∣∣V diA ∣∣ = subn(k1) · subn(k2), and ∣∣V diE ∣∣ ≤ [subn(k1)]2 · [subn(k2)]2 · |Σ|.
Hence,
∣∣V diA ∪ V diE ∣∣ ≤ 2 · [subn(k1)]2 · [subn(k2)]2 · |Σ| ≤ 2 · (n+1)2(k1+k2) · |Σ|. ⊓⊔
Transitions in V diA × V diE model choices of Spoiler: For any (q, s, a,q′, s′) ∈ Γ Sp,
there is a transition for Adam v(q,s) → v(q,s,a,q′,s′). Similarly, for any Duplicator’s
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move (q, s, a,q′, s′,q′′, s′′) ∈ ΓDup, there exists a transition for Eve v(q,s,a,q′,s′) →
v(q′′,s′′) in V diE × V diA .
The winning criterion for existential direct simulation induces a set T ∃ of safe ver-
tices T ∃ = {v(q,s) ∈ V diA | q ⊆ F implies s ∩ F 6= ∅}. Similarly, the safe set for
universal direct simulation is T ∀ = {v(q,s) ∈ V diA | q ∩ F 6= ∅ implies s ⊆ F}. For
x ∈ {∃, ∀}, we have that q ⊑xdi(k1,k2) s iff Eve can ensure never leaving T
x when starting
from v(q,s). This can be verified by checking whether v(q,s) ∈W xdi, where
W xdi = νy. T x ∩ cpre(y) .
E.2 Solving fair simulation
The game-graph for fair simulation is similiar to the previous one for direct simula-
tion, but with the difference that we need extra bookkeeping for recording whether
each pebble has visited an accepting state or not. We let Gf = 〈V fE , V fA,→f〉, where
Adam’s nodes in V fA are of the form v(q,bad,s,good) and Eve’s nodes in V fE are of the form
v(q,bad,s,good,a,q′,s′), where q,q′, s, s′ ⊆ Q. The sets bad ⊆ q and good ⊆ s record the
current “badness/goodness” of states in q and s, respectively, and they are used to detect
events like “being good since some previous round”: Specifically, the event bad= ∅ is
used to detect when good∀(q), and similarly for good=s and good∃(s).
Lemma 19.
∣∣V f ∣∣ ≤ 2 · (n+ 1)2(k1+k2) · 2k1+k2 · |Σ|.
Proof. ∣∣V fA∣∣ = subn(k1) · subn(k2) · 2k1+k2 , and ∣∣V fE ∣∣ ≤ [subn(k1) · subn(k2)]2 ·
2k1+k2 · |Σ|. Hence,
∣∣V fA ∪ V fE ∣∣ ≤ 2 · [subn(k1) · subn(k2)]2 · 2k1+k2 · |Σ| ≤ 2 · (n+
1)2(k1+k2) · 2k1+k2 · |Σ|. ⊓⊔
For any (q, s, a,q′′, s′′) ∈ Γ Sp, v(q,bad,s,good) → v(q,bad,s,good,a,q′′,s′′), and, for
any (q, s, a,q′′, s′′,q′, s′) ∈ ΓDup, v(q,bad,s,good,a,q′′,s′′) → v(q′,bad′,s′,good′), where
good′ =
{
s′ ∩ F if good = s
{s ∈ s′ | s ∈ F ∨ s ∈ ∆(good, a)} otherwise
bad′ =
{
q′ \ F if bad = ∅
{q ∈ q′ | q 6∈ F ∧ q ∈ ∆(bad, a)} otherwise
We notice the striking similarity of the update rule for bad pebbles and the updating
rule for the second component in the MH-construction (Section 4). Intuitively, states
in bad′ are those states in q′ which are not accepting and with some bad predecessor.
Similarly, states in good′ are those states in s′ which are either accepting, or with some
good predecessor. The correctness follows from the following simple fact:
Claim. Let π = v0v1 . . . be an infinite sequence of vertices, with vi = v(qi,badi,si,goodi)
and s.t. vi → vi+1. Let π1 = q0q1 . . . and π3 = s0s1 . . . be the projections of π to the
first and third component, respectively. Then, good∀(π1,∞) iff badi = ∅ for infinitely
many i’s, and good∃(π3,∞) iff goodi = si for infinitely many i’s.
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Let T1 be the set of states of the form v(q,bad,s,good) with bad = ∅, and let T2 be
the set of states of the form v(q,bad,s,good) with good = s. The winning criterion for
fair simulation is translated in the following 1-pair Street condition (also known as a
reactivity condition [9]): If T1 is visited infinitely often, then T2 is visited infinitely
often. Therefore, winning nodes for Eve are those in
W f = νx . µy . νz .
(
T2 ∩ cpre(x) ∪ T1 ∩ cpre(y) ∪ T 1 ∩ cpre(z)
)
.
E.3 Solving delayed simulation
We recall the definition of the game-graph for computing delayed simuation: Gde =
〈V deE , V
de
A ,→
de〉, where
V deA = {v(q,Bad,s,Good) | q, s ⊆ Q}
V deE = {v(q,Bad,s,Good,a,q′,s′) | q,q
′, s, s′ ⊆ Q}
and Bad,Good are two sequences of sets of states from Q, strictly ordered by set-
inclusion. More precisely, Bad = 〈b1, . . . ,bm1〉 with 0 ≤ m1 ≤ k1, satisfies, for any
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m1},
bi ⊆ q (B1)
bi+1 ⊂ bi, when i < m1 (B2)
bm1 6= ∅ , (B3)
and Good = 〈g1, . . . ,gm2〉 with 0 ≤ m2 ≤ k2, satisfies, for any i ∈ {1, . . . ,m2},
gi ⊆ s (G1)
gi ⊂ gi+1, when i < m2 (G2)
We also denote with Bad the set {b1, . . . ,bm1}, and similarly for Good.
The following lemma states that Algorithm 1 preserves the definition of Bad,Good:
Lemma 20. If Bad and Good satisfy properties (B1)-(B3) and (G1)-(G2), resp., then
the same holds for the sets Bad′ and Good′ as computed by Algorithm 1.
Proof. Properties (B1) and (G1) are preserved by how b′ and g′ are constructed, on
lines 4 and 15, respectively. Similarly, the strictess of the order, i.e., (B2) and (G2),
is preserved by removing duplicate elements (lines 6 and 17). Finally, property (B3)
follows by the check at line 8, which enforces that empty elements are removed from
Bad′, if any (line 9). ⊓⊔
Lemma 7.
∣∣V de∣∣ ≤ 2·(n+1)2(k1+k2) ·(1 + (k1 + 1)k1+1)·(1 + 2(k2 + 1)k2+1)·|Σ|.
Proof. We first count the number of pairs (s,Good). Assume |gm2 | = h ≤ k2 (notice
that m2 ≤ h). We consider two cases, depending on whether g1 6= ∅ or not. First case:
g1 6= ∅. Then, we can represent the strictly increasing sequence g1 ⊂ g2 ⊂ · · · ⊂
gm2 by the sequence {di}1≤i≤m2 of non-empty differences, defined as d1 = g1 and
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Algorithm 1: Updating the sequences Good and Bad
Input: The sequences Good = 〈g1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ gm2 〉 and Bad = 〈b1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ bm1〉 to be
updated, the current input symbol a ∈ Σ and the next configuration 〈q′, s′〉.
Output: The updated sequences Good′ and Bad′
Add q to Bad, i.e.,1
Bad = 〈q ⊇ b1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ bm1〉
Bad
′ = 〈〉;2
foreach (b ∈ Bad) do3
4
b
′ = { s ∈ q′ | s 6∈ F ∧ s ∈ ∆(b, a) }
Add b′ to Bad′;5
Remove duplicate elements from Bad′;6
Assume Bad′ = 〈b′1 ⊃ · · · ⊃ b′m′
1
〉;7
if (b′m′
1
= ∅) then8
Remove b′m′
1
from Bad′;9
Add ∅ to the front of Good, i.e.,10
Good = 〈∅ ⊆ g1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ gm2〉
if (gm2 = s) then11
Remove gm2 from Good;12
Good
′ = 〈〉;13
foreach (g ∈ Good) do14
15
g
′ = { s ∈ s′ | s ∈ F ∨ s ∈ ∆(g, a) }
Add g′ to Good′;16
Remove duplicate elements from Good′;17
return Good′ and Bad′;18
di+1 = gi+1 \ gi for i > 1. (We have that gi =
⋃i
j=1 di, so no information is lost.)
Notice that, by definition, D = {d1, . . . ,dm2} is a partition of gm2 = {g1, . . . , gh},
hence D may be represented by a surjective function f from gm2 to D s.t. f(gi) = dj
iff gi ∈ dj . Let
{
h
m2
}
be the Stirling number of the second kind. Then, the number of
sequences ∅ 6= g1 ⊂ g1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ gm2 is
seqh(m2) :=
{
h
m2
}
·m2! .
Second case: g1 = ∅. Thus g2 6= ∅, hence the number of sequences ∅ = g1 ⊂ g2 ⊂
· · · ⊂ gm2 is just as before, but with one less element in the sequence, i.e., seqh(m2 −
1). Hence, the number of pairs (s,Good) is
f2(n, k2) =
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 +
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
) h∑
m2=1
(seqh(m2) + seqh(m2 − 1))
)
.
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I.e., we sum over all sizes i for sets s, and either Good is empty, or Good is non-
empty. In this second case, we sum over all possibilities for the size h ∈ {1, . . . , i}
of the largest gm2 (by (G1), every g ∈ Good is ⊆ s), and over all possibilities for
the number of elements m2 in Good: For each such combination of indices, we have
seqh(m2)+seqh(m2−1) sequences. We now proceed to derive a bound on f2(n, k2).
As seqh(m2) represents the number of surjective functions from a set of size h to a set
of size m2, clearly seqh(m2) ≤ mh2 , just considering all such functions. Then,
f2(n, k2) ≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 +
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
) h∑
m2=1
2 ·mh2
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 +
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
) h∑
m2=1
2 · hh
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 + 2 ·
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
)
hh+1
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 + 2 · i ·
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
)
ih
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 + 2 · i · (i+ 1)i
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 + 2 · (i+ 1)i+1
)
≤
k2∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 + 2 · (k2 + 1)
k2+1
)
≤ (n+ 1)k2 ·
(
1 + 2 · (k2 + 1)
k2+1
)
.
We now count the number of pairs (q,Bad). Assume |b1| = h ≤ k1 (notice that
m1 ≤ h). By an argument similar to the one in the previous paragraph, we have that the
number of non-empty sequences b1 ⊃ b2 ⊃ · · · ⊃ bm1 6= ∅ is seqh(m1). Hence, the
number of pairs (q,Bad) is
f1(n, k1) =
k1∑
i=1
(
n
i
)(
1 +
i∑
h=1
(
i
h
) h∑
m1=1
seqh(m1)
)
,
which, with a similar calculation to the above, can be shown to be bounded by
f1(n, k1) ≤ (n+ 1)
k1 ·
(
1 + (k1 + 1)
k1+1
)
.
Finally,
∣∣V deA ∣∣ ≤ f1(n, k1) · f2(n, k2), and ∣∣V deE ∣∣ ≤ f1(n, k1) · f2(n, k2) · (n +
1)k1+k2 · |Σ|, thus
∣∣V deA ∪ V deE ∣∣ ≤ 2 · f1(n, k1) · f2(n, k2) · (n + 1)k1+k2 · |Σ| ≤
2 · (n+ 1)2(k1+k2) ·
(
1 + (k1 + 1)
k1+1
)
·
(
1 + 2 · (k2 + 1)k2+1
)
· |Σ|. ⊓⊔
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